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ABSTRACT
In the first chapter, I develop a representative agent model in which the purchase of
consumption goods must be planned in advance. Volatility in the agent’s portfolio
increases the risk that a purchase cannot be implemented. This implementation risk
causes the agent to make conservative consumption plans. In the model, this leads
to persistent and negatively skewed consumption growth and a slow reaction of con-
sumption to wealth shocks. The model proposes a novel explanation for the negative
relation between volatility and expected utility. In equilibrium, prices of risky assets
must compensate for the utility loss. Hence, the model suggests a new mechanism
for generating the equity risk premium. Importantly, because implementation risk
does not rely on the co-movement of asset prices with marginal utility, the resulting
equity premium does not require concavity of the intratemporal utility function. In
the second chapter, I challenge the view that equity market timing always benefits
shareholders. By distinguishing the effect of a firm’s equity decisions from the effect
of mispricing itself, I show that market timing can decrease shareholder value. Addi-
tionally, the timing of equity sales has a more negative effect on existing shareholders
than the timing of share repurchases. My theory can be used to infer firms’ maxi-
mization objectives from their observed market timing strategies. I argue that the
popularity of stock buybacks, the low frequency of seasoned equity offerings, and the
observed post-event stock returns are consistent with managers maximizing current
shareholder value.
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Chapter 1
PRE-BUDGETING OF CONSUMPTION
1.1 Introduction
The canonical consumption-based asset pricing model presented by Lucas (1978)
does not connect consumption growth with market returns in the real world. The
low volatility of consumption growth and its moderate correlation with equity returns
cannot justify the magnitude of the observed equity premium (see Mehra and Prescott
(1985) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)). At the same time, consumption growth
appears to react too slowly to ex post market returns, and it is only weakly correlated
with equity return.1
A common assumption in the current literature is that consumption can be ad-
justed instantaneously so that shocks to an individual’s investment returns are im-
mediately reflected in his or her consumption. But, in reality, getting ready to make
a purchase can be a lengthy process. It requires the consumer to search for rele-
vant information, compare products, reach a decision about what to buy, arrange
1Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) point out that the consumption-wealth ratio should be at a con-
stant level when market return is unpredictable. However, given the observed high volatility of
the equity market and low volatility of consumption growth, it is impossible to have a constant
consumption-wealth ratio. Campbell and Deaton (1989) document that consumption reacts too
little to household income innovations and is sensitive to lagged income innovations. Marshall and
Parekh (1999) document that most consumption series are only weakly positively correlated with
equity returns and some even move in the opposite direction from equity returns.
1
financing and close the deal.2 Thus, consumption must be planned in advance (“pre-
budgeted”).3 In this paper, I model consumer decisions when immediate consumption
adjustment is not possible and demonstrate that uncertainty in future wealth results
in the inefficient allocation of money to consumption and investment. This result
implies that the difficulty in planning for future consumption can be an important
factor in resolving the tension between equity returns and consumption growth. In
my model, the consumption growth that is generated has lower volatility and a lower
correlation with market returns than it does in the conventional models. Consistent
with the data, the model generates a positive autocorrelation and negative skewness in
consumption growth, and a high correlation between consumption growth and lagged
market returns. Pre-budgeting technology also makes consumption to react slowly
to wealth fluctuations. Therefore, wealth shocks can easily drive consumption and
investment away from the desired paths.4 This risk of inefficient allocation provides
a novel channel for the agent’s risk-aversion. To avoid wealth fluctuations, the agent
underinvests in risky assets. Thus, a risk premium can be generated through market
volatility in addition to the co-movement of market returns and consumption growth.
The key intuition is that a consumer makes a conservative purchase plan when
faced with uncertainty in future wealth. For example, consider the decision to pur-
chase an automobile. Even if the consumer can afford to purchase an automobile now,
2Campbell and Deaton (1989) find that consumption growth is positively correlated with lagged
income growth. Similarly, Caballero (1990) shows that a slow reaction to shocks helps to fit a PIH
model in the consumption data.
3The term “pre-budget” comes from HM Treasury reports in the UK. From 1997 to 2009, the
HM Treasury submitted a pre-budget statement every year including an update on the state of the
government’s finances and the national economy, as well as the proposals under consideration for
the final budget.
4In other words, the consumption-wealth ratio is predicted to vary over time owing to the uncer-
tainty of market return.
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finding the right model and negotiating the terms of the deal can take substantial
time, during which the consumer’s financial status is subject to deterioration. Be-
cause of this wealth uncertainty, he may optimally choose a less expensive automobile
than he would if he could make the purchase immediately or if there were no wealth
uncertainty.
This idea is first formalized in a simple two-period model.5 A consumer is modeled
with a non-satiated utility function. Initially, he is endowed with a certain amount
of cash and durable goods in stock. Since the consumer cannot buy durable goods
immediately, he has to invest the money and schedule a future purchase with the goal
of maximizing his future utility. Nevertheless, the implementation of the durables
purchase is subject to the realization of his future wealth level. When his investment
return is not sufficient to pay for the purchase, the consumer has to abandon the
purchase and consume only the durables he has in stock. In contrast, if his future
wealth turns out to be larger than the planned consumption expenditure, he will
5To illustrate the main economic mechanism in the model, I focus on durable goods consump-
tion in my model settings. Planning for durables consumption is an important decision for most
of the consumers since it typically requires a large lump-sum payment and can have far-reaching
consequences for their well-being. Most people need to gather information about the best available
products before making a purchase. Completing the transaction can also take time. Moreover,
because most of the durable purchases are indivisible, it is likely that the whole purchase will need
to be postponed or dropped if it cannot be fully implemented. I later discuss how the model and
its implications can be changed when non-durables consumption is incorporated. However, it does
not exclude the interpretation under a different context. For example, durables in stock can be
interpreted as a default consumption plan of non-durable consumption.
3
proceed with the purchase. But his residual cash will not result in any additional
utility.6
A trivial case occurs when the consumer invests entirely in risk-free assets which
makes his future wealth deterministic. To maximize the expected utility, the con-
sumer would then plan for a purchase that costs all his future wealth and is certain
to be implemented. In contrast, holding risky assets substantially complicates the
consumer’s decision-making about the consumption purchase plan. If the consumer
is rich enough in the future, he will derive high utility from a large durable goods
purchase. But uncertainty of the payoffs from risky assets can lead to failure to make
the purchase with a nonzero probability. Therefore, the consumer is essentially faced
with a trade-off between greater consumption and a higher probability of making
a successful purchase given the distribution of asset payoffs. I find that the con-
sumer optimally plans his purchase expenditure to be lower than his expected future
wealth. The difference between the expenditure on the purchase and the consumer’s
expected wealth increases with the variance of the investment return and decreases
with the quantity of initial durables in stock. Intuitively, high volatility of future
wealth would lead the consumer to make a highly conservative purchase plan because
a sizable downgrade of the planned expenditure would be necessary to effectively
boost the success rate of the purchase when the states of future wealth are dispersed.
When the initial stock of durables is low, missing a purchase opportunity is painful.
Thus, the consumer would be more concerned about the success rate and underweight
the magnitude of the consumption increment.
6Assuming that residual wealth will be wasted is a simplification. In reality, the unplanned part
of wealth can generate some utility, but still it would be lower than if expenditure had been planned
in advance. Hence the qualitative predictions are not changed by this simplification.
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The model generates important implications for both consumption dynamics and
asset prices. First, this model fits the observed consumption data better. Similar to
models with consumption adjustment costs, such as those developed by Grossman
and Laroque (1990) and Chetty and Szeidl (2010), the conservative consumption
policy in my model causes a lower volatility of consumption growth relative to the
canonical model used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Moreover, a low correlation
between market return and the contemporaneous consumption growth is enforced
through several channels. In addition to direct effects, such as conservative planning
and delayed consumption adjustment, restricting realized consumption growth to the
planned level also matters. Since consumption growth in the model is bounded from
above by the purchase plan laid out in the previous period, a large positive shock in
wealth cannot be fully transmitted to the consumption growth in the near future.
Importantly, the model implies that the risk premium—or equivalently, investors’
preference for risk-free assets—does not rely on the concavity of the intratemporal
utility function. Consider a pair of assets with the same expected returns but different
risk profiles, one risky and the other risk-free. When an instantaneous adjustment
of consumption is allowed, investors’ preference for the risk-free asset can only arise
through Jensen’s inequality. Thus, concavity of the utility function is necessary to
generate risk aversion and an equity premium. However, when instantaneous con-
sumption adjustment is not possible, risk-aversion can be generated through the in-
efficiency of consumption plan. With the risk-free asset, investors can perfectly plan
for future consumption and make use of all their wealth. In contrast, holders of risky
assets have to stick with one consumption plan, which leads to a waste of wealth in
almost all future states. The waste thus reduces the investors’ expected utility and
does not depend on the concavity of the utility function. Nonetheless, the concavity
of the utility function magnifies this effect by causing the consumption growth to be
5
more conservative. I show that a risk premium is present regardless of the curvature
of the utility function, and it increases with concavity of the intratemporal utility
function.
Several other predictions can be obtained from the comparative statics of the
model. Because higher volatility and a lower initial durables endowment leads to
larger distortions in consumption, the utility lost due to wasted wealth increases
with market volatility and decreases with initial durable goods in stock. Hence, the
risk premium of one asset moves together with its return volatility. Similarly, more
durables in stock predicts a lower risk premium. It further means that the risk-
premium can be predictable when market volatility or the consumption of the econ-
omy changes over time. This prediction is consistent with the evidence documented
in the asset pricing literature.7
The same idea is further developed in an intertemporal model that can enrich
the results on a dynamic and quantitative base. An infinitely-lived representative
agent is modeled with a time-additive power utility. In each period he maximizes his
expected utility by choosing the current consumption level according to his current
wealth and the consumption plan proposed in the previous period. He decides whether
to adjust his consumption according to his plan from the previous period. At the
same time, he plans for his next-period consumption adjustment. Unlike in the two-
period model, unexpended wealth can be saved or invested for future use. Therefore,
wealth is not wasted, and the goal of the consumption plan is to achieve an optimal
consumption-wealth relation in the next period rather than to expend all wealth.
Nonetheless, failure to implement a consumption purchase will still lead to utility
7For example, French et al. (1987) document that the expected market volatility positively pre-
dicts the equity premium. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) observe that consumption-wealth ratio
predicts market returns.
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loss due to the deviation from the optimal consumption path, or more specifically,
due to a delay in consumption.8 Therefore the main results obtained in the two-
period model are qualitatively preserved in the infinite-period model, although the
magnitude of pre-budgeting’s effects can be different. Indeed, the solution shows that
investors holding risky assets schedule purchases that are too conservative relative
to the optimal consumption implied by their expected future wealth. The difference
between planned and optimal consumption depends on the volatility of asset returns
and the distance of current consumption from the optimal level.
While the main results remain unchanged, the intertemporal model offers addi-
tional implications for the dynamics of consumption and market returns. In a risky
economy, a market portfolio holder almost never achieves his optimal consumption-
wealth relation.9 First, shocks to the economy have a highly persistent effect: a large
positive shock can influence consumption for several periods. More specifically, once
the consumption-wealth ratio falls below the optimal level because of a positive wealth
shock, consumption growth is constrained to take very small steps over multiple pe-
riods to catch up with past wealth growth. This result can explain why consumption
growth data sometimes exhibit positive autocorrelation and why consumption growth
has a high correlation with past equity returns. Additionally, although instantaneous
8More precisely, failure to implement a consumption plan occurs whenever the consumer’s wealth
realization does not lie in the optimal range for proceeding with his consumption plan. This happens
more often than the failure of implementation due to lack of financing. Because in the intertemporal
model the consumer will choose not to implement the plan whenever his consumption plan would
drive his consumption-wealth relation even further away from the ideal target, even if he has enough
money to make the consumption adjustment.
9It is in contrary to canonical models and models with consumption adjustment cost. For exam-
ple, in Grossman and Laroque (1990), a consumer achieves his optimal consumption-wealth ratio
whenever an adjustment is conducted.
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adjustment is not allowed, there remains a moderate correlation between the realized
market return and the contemporaneous consumption growth. For instance, a high
market return may lead to successful implementation of a purchase plan with a high
probability, i.e. positive consumption growth, while low market returns are likely
to induce zero or negative consumption growth. Hence, the model does not exclude
the predictability of consumption growth by market return but loosens the tight link
implied by the earlier literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After the literature review in Section
1.2, Section 1.3 presents a simple two-period model to illustrate the basic intuition.
Section 1.4 sets up a representative-agent model with intertemporal consumption and
portfolio choices that characterizes a consumer’s choices, and discusses the implica-
tions for asset prices and consumption dynamics. The final section concludes the
paper.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the consumption-based asset pricing literature by ex-
tending the canonical model with a novel friction, namely the pre-budgeting of con-
sumption, and discussing its implications for asset prices. The canonical consumption-
based asset pricing model, studied by Lucas (1978), Rubinstein (1976), and Hansen
and Singleton (1983), models risk as the covariance of stock returns and consumption
growth. However, Mehra and Prescott (1985) present the equity premium puzzle
by showing that the magnitude of excess equity returns cannot be justified by the
low historical covariance between market returns and consumption growth when a
reasonable level of risk-aversion is imposed. A large literature attempts to resolve
the equity premium puzzle. One strand of literature works through new assumptions
on the agent’s utility function. For example, studies by Abel (1990), Constantinides
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(1990), Heaton (1993) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) propose a variety of habit-
formation models. Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) generalize the power utility
to allow a separation between elasticity of intertemporal substitution and relative risk
aversion. Subsequently, Bansal and Yaron (2004) develop a model that combines the
Epstein-Zin preferences with long-run risks in consumption growth in order to match
the magnitude of the equity premium. In contrast, the risk premium in my model
does not require any specific features in the utility function, not even concavity. An-
other strand of the literature, represented by Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), and Gabaix
(2008), investigates whether the equity premium might be driven by unobserved rare
disasters and tail risks. In contrast, I model normally distributed shocks.
Recent literature has drawn attention to the consumption of durable goods and
luxuries. In particular, Yogo (2006) models durable goods consumption together with
non-durables and shows success in explaining time-variation in the equity premium.
Pakosˇ (2004) studies the interaction of durables and non-durables in a similar setting
and concludes that the equity premium puzzle is alleviated if the two goods are
perfect compliments. Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2004) show that the inclusion of luxury goods
consumption can help to mitigate the equity premium puzzle. Yang (2011) proposes a
solution to the equity premium puzzle through long-run risks in durables consumption
based on the empirical persistence of durables growth. My study also links asset prices
to durable goods consumption. Eraker and Wang (2013) introduce a model with
inflation risk with persistent durables consumption growth. In contrast to these earlier
works, I start with a micro friction and generate consumption growth endogenously,
while they treat consumption growth in the pricing kernel as an exogenous input.
For example, related to Yang (2011) and Eraker and Wang (2013), the innovation of
consumption growth in my model may also exhibit persistence. The persistence in
my model is not assumed, however, but results from the pre-budgeting friction.
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My model is not the first to address frictions in consumption adjustments. Gross-
man and Laroque (1990) develop a model in which consumers are allowed to adjust
consumption instantaneously but with a fixed cost. In their model, consumption is
predicted to be adjusted infrequently in large steps. Marshall and Parekh (1999) show
in a simulation that Grossman and Laroque’s (1990) model can partially fill the gap
between equity premium and consumption volatility.
Similar to Grossman and Laroque (1990), Hindy and Huang (1993) and Cuoco
and Liu (2000) study an economy with adjustment costs but assume divisible durable
goods. Hindy and Huang (1993) emphasize the implications of asymmetric adjust-
ment costs for durable goods consumption, while Cuoco and Liu (2000) characterize
an economy with a more general setting under which adjustment costs can be freely
chosen. The asymmetric costs modeled in Hindy and Huang (1993) are also perceived
as a general case of consumption adjustment irreversibility because the asymmetric
costs make selling consumption goods are more difficult than new purchases.10 My
paper shares the implication of low volatility of consumption growth with the above
papers. 11 In contrast to the literature of adjustment costs, my model does not impose
any financial costs to adjustment and generates different dynamics of consumption
growth, such as the predictability of consumption growth.
Among the recent innovations in the literature of adjustment costs, Chetty and
Szeidl (2010) decompose consumption into two components — one that can be ad-
10The irreversibility added in brings new insights about consumption good durability when selling
costs exist — long durability leads to less smooth purchases. In contrast, my paper does not generate
any implications related to consumption goods durability because consumption adjustment does not
incur any cost to the consumer in this paper.
11However, unlike the papers model adjustment cost, the low consumption volatility is not directly
driven by infrequent adjustment. The adjustments in my model do not occur every period, but
happen very frequently.
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justed freely, and another, namely consumption commitments, that is subject to
adjustment cost. A crucial assumption of their model is that the commitments have
to be non-durables consumption or generate comparable level of expenditures in each
period. In this way, the future expenditure commitments lever up the consumer’s
exposure to wealth shocks. In my model, no obligation is imposed to the consumer’s
future expenditure because the pre-budgeted purchase can be abandoned without any
financial penalty.
One set of studies is dedicated to reconciling the smooth consumption growth
and its correlation with wealth shocks through consumption aggregation. Caballero
(1990) imposes slowness in reaction to consumers and argues that it is consistent
with the durables consumption data. Caballero (1993) further attributes the hetero-
geneity of reaction speed to the arrivals of households’ idiosyncratic shocks. Lynch
(1996) and Gabaix and Laibson (2001) customize the aggregation of individual con-
sumption through non-synchronous and infrequent adjustments. These four studies
all model heterogeneous agents and their corresponding results hold only at the ag-
gregate level. Besides our differences in the micro foundation of slowness in reaction,
my work focuses on a representative agent. I obtain all the similar predictions at
the individual-consumer level, such as the positive autocorrelation of consumption
growth, low correlation between consumption growth, and market returns and high
correlation between consumption growth and past market returns.
The literature intensively discusses the impact of institutional investors on asset
prices ever since the financial crisis in 2008-2009 (for example, see Manconi et al.
(2012)). As institutional investors are substituting the consumers as the primary
traders in the market recently, there are concerns that consumers are losing the power
of setting the price on the market. This paper does not explicitly model institutional
investors. However, the institutional investors are hired by consumers for wealth
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management. They should aim on tracking the consumers’ preference and mimicking
the choices of the consumers in order to maintain their business. Therefore, although
the institutional investors might help the consumer on hedging idiosyncratic risks in
the stocks, the price of systematic risks that consumers are faced with should still be
reflected in the asset prices.
1.3 A Two-Period Model
In this section, I present a simple two-period model that illustrates how uncer-
tainty in future wealth influences one’s consumption plan. In the next section, I
extend the same idea to an intertemporal setting.
Consider a consumer who lives for one period only and receives utility u(·) for
service generated by a single durable consumption good. Initially, the consumer
is endowed with wealth W0 and consumption goods in stock D0 at time 0. Since
he cannot buy new consumption good immediately, he has to invest all the money
and plan a durable purchase for his time-1 consumption. The investment return is
exogenously given, and only the distribution is known at time 0. At time 1, he receives
the realized investment payoff and makes the planned purchase if it is affordable. For
simplicity, I assume that the consumer does not receive any other income in addition
to his investment payoffs at time 1. In the end, the consumer receives utility from his
durable good in stock and the new purchased good together. Note that the consumer’s
goal is to maximize his expected utility at time 1 and that he is aware of the risk in
his investment when he chooses the consumption plan at time 0.
The assumption that the consumer cannot adjust his consumption immediately
but has to plan for it is the unique feature of this study. I call it the “pre-budgeting
of consumption”. This assumption is meant to capture the time cost of consumption
adjustment. It usually takes time for an individual to alter his consumption habits
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and find a proper product that meets his needs. The prevailing research in macroe-
conomics and finance usually assumes that consumption expenditure is sufficient to
summarize the parameters of a utility function. Thus people may mistakenly assume
that making decisions about one’s consumption is simply a matter of choosing how
much to spend. In fact, one consumer may find that his utility of similar products
varies even if the products are sold at the same price. Also, costs may differ ac-
cording to the channel of purchase. Therefore, to maximize one’s utility at a given
level of expenditure, the consumer must choose the least expensive product in the
market that serves him best. This often-ignored step of consumption optimization
can take a substantial amount of time. To learn one’s preferences among the different
products, the consumer may have to gather relevant information from the product
markets and experiment with the products. Meanwhile, it may be difficult to find an
acceptable price for the preferred products, if, for example, the product market is not
very liquid, such as the second-hand automobile and housing markets, or discounts
are offered only for early reservations (e.g., air-tickets and hotels).12
The consumer’s plan for time-1 consumption expenditure is denoted as Dp.
13 At
time 1, the value of the consumer’s durables in stock depreciates to D0(1−δ), where δ
12Of course, some of the time cost can be exchanged for financial cost. For example, one can
pay a premium to get a deal closed faster. But many people may prefer to pay with time instead
of money. In this paper, to stay focused on the time cost and keep the model tractable, I assume
that people always choose to pay with time instead of money; i.e., I am not modeling the decision
between spending more time and spending more money.
13I restrict the consumer’s planning to a single level of expenditure Dp, instead of multiple levels.
Although a consumer may consider several products, all of them are usually in a similar price range.
For example, a consumer may plan to purchase an automobile produced by either BMW or Audi,
but it is unlikely that he would consider purchasing either an automobile or a bicycle. Second, given
an individuals limited amount of energy, one well-thought-out plan is likely to be more efficient than
several fuzzy plans.
13
is the depreciation rate. His ex post consumption D1 depends on the realization of his
wealth by then. Only when the realization of his future wealth is enough to pay for
the durables does it increase from D0(1−δ) to Dp, has he the option to consume Dp at
time 1. Otherwise, he has to consume his durables in stock D0(1− δ).14 Hence, when
he is holding a risky asset, the implementation of the consumption plan is uncertain
ex ante and depends on his investment return R˜. Therefore the optimization problem
of the consumer at time 0 can be written as follows:
V0(W0, D0) =max
Dp
Eu(D1)
s.t. D1 =

Dp, if W0R˜ > p(Dp − (1− δ)D0)
(1− δ)D0, otherwise
(1.1)
where p is the price of durable goods and D1 is the level of the consumer’s time-1
consumption.
To solve this optimization problem, one should search for the best plan Dp given
the distribution of the portfolio return R˜. It is natural to consider two polar cases:
(i) when the consumer invests all his wealth in the risk-free security; and (ii) when
he invests in a portfolio of risky assets.
14Note that there is an implicit assumption that consumption goods are indivisible. In addition
keeping the model simple, I have attempted to make the assumptions realistic. Adjusting consump-
tion may not be a singular decision. We know that consumption goods are not independent from
each other, so a large consumption adjustment usually reflects a change of life style. When one
consumption good is adjusted, its substitutes and complements may also have to be adjusted. For
instance, buying a new video game may require a consumer to upgrade his TV. Moving to a bigger
house might entail relocation expenses, the purchase of new furniture, the need for a new vehicle.
The purchase of an automobile will also require a new insurance policy and perhaps a new parking
plan.
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If the consumer holds a risk-free security only, solving for the best plan Dp is
straightforward. Since time 1 is the last period in this simple model, the consumer
would like to spend as much as possible on his consumption. When the consumer
holds the risk-free asset, his wealth at time 1 is equal to W0Rf . In this case, the
consumer plans to increase durables from D0(1− δ) to D1 = D0(1− δ) + W0Rfp . Since
it is certain that the plan will be implemented, his time-1 utility has a deterministic
value, i.e.
V0(W0, D0) = u(D0(1− δ) + W0Rf
p
). (1.2)
In contrast, holding the market portfolio can substantially complicate consump-
tion planning. Because the payoff of market portfolio is uncertain, there is a risk that
the consumption plan cannot be implemented. When the market return is low, an
aggressive consumption plan (a high Dp) is not affordable, so the consumer will miss
the opportunity to spend his wealth and will have to consume D0(1 − δ). Likewise,
if the consumption plan is too conservative (a low Dp), the consumer’s time-1 con-
sumption will have an upper bound of Dp; hence he may waste a good part of his
investment earnings if his investment return is high. Thus there is a tradeoff between
the plan’s feasibility and the additional utility provided by a successful purchase im-
plementation. To quantify this tradeoff, I substitute D1 into the objective function
and obtain the FOC
u′(D∗p)(1−F (
p(D∗p − (1− δ)D0)
W0
)) =
p
W0
f(
p(D∗p − (1− δ)D0)
W0
)(u(D∗p)−u((1−δ)D0)),
(1.3)
where F (·) and f(·) are the cumulative distribution function and the probability
density function of the portfolio return R˜.15
15Please refer to appendix for details of the derivation.
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The FOC reflects the tradeoff faced by a risky asset holder. The left-hand side of
the equation measures the marginal benefit of increasing the consumption plan Dp.
When the consumer plans for a larger purchase, his utility increases in good states
of the world when the consumption plan can be implemented. However, as captured
by the right-hand side of the equation, because a larger consumption plan requires
a higher realization of investment return, his utility drops from u(Dp) to u(D0) in
some of the states. Thus the right-hand side represents the cost of raising Dp. At the
optimal point D∗p, marginally raising the consumption plan induces the same amount
of costs and benefits.
1.3.1 Conservative Planning
First, I introduce an important property of the optimizer D∗p and then analyze
the sufficient condition for this property in Proposition 1.
Definition A consumption plan D∗p is conservative if it aims to spend less than
the consumer’s expected wealth, or mathematically, p(D∗p − (1− δ)D0) < (1 + µ)W0.
Proposition 1 (Conservative Planning) Suppose the (gross) investment return
follows a distribution F (·) and has an expected value 1 + µ and the consumer has a
continuous utility function u(·) satisfying u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0, then his plan for
date-1 consumption is conservative, if ∀ x ≥ 1 + µ, 1− F (x) < xF ′(x).16
This is a key result of the paper because all further implications for consumption
dynamics are based on conservative consumption plans. The proposition provides
a sufficient condition that needs to be imposed on investment returns in order to
guarantee that the consumer makes a conservative consumption plan. To illustrate
that this condition is typically satisfied in practice, I discuss what it implies for
16Mathematical proof is available in the appendix.
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the first and second moment of returns when asset returns are either uniformly or
normally distributed. I show in the appendix that for a uniform distribution U [a, b],
the sufficient condition is equivalent to a > 0.17 In the context of gross investment
return, a > 0 holds for all assets that have limited liability.
Normal distribution may be a more interesting case as it characterizes the returns
of most investment assets. In appendix, I show that for a normal distribution N (1 +
µ, σ2) the sufficient condition in Proposition 1 is satisfied if 1 + µ >
√
pi
2
σ. This
criterion requires that volatility is low relative to the mean, which implies that the
return distribution cannot be too dispersed. Nevertheless, this criterion is satisfied
for most non-insurance assets in the market. For example, for the gross market return
that has a mean of 1 + µ = 1.08 and volatility of σ = 0.20 over an annual horizon,
this condition is satisfied with slack, i.e., 1 + µ = 1.08 >>
√
pi
2
σ = 1.25 ∗ 0.20 = 0.25.
Furthermore, unless an asset provides some insurance to consumers, it should have a
gross expected return greater than 1. Thus the results of Proposition 1 can be applied
to any risky portfolio with volatility σ < 80%.18
With the bell curve of a normal distribution, it is easy to understand why the
optimal consumption plan is conservative. Recall that lowering Dp from the expected
return generates two opposite marginal effects — increasing the probability of a suc-
cessful plan implementation and lowering the utility level upon implementation. The
probability density of the normal distribution is high around its mean. Therefore,
17In the appendix I also show that the same condition guarantees that the optimal plan Dp is
unique in the case of uniform distribution or normal distribution.
18To be more realistic, expected return µ should increase with σ. For example, if I assume that
CAPM holds, and the market portfolio has µ = 0.08 as a reward for σ = 0.20. Extrapolating this
reward ratio, 1+µ >
√
pi
2σ requires that σ < 1.18. One would rarely want a portfolio with σ > 1.18,
because the probability is higher 10% that the portfolio will eat up every penny in his account before
next Christmas Day.
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it is better for a consumer to lower his potential consumption Dp in exchange for a
large increase in the success rate of plan implementation.
As in many other consumption models, the optimization of consumption in my
model depends on many parameters, such as the shape of the asset return distri-
bution and consumer preferences. I focus on the normal distribution N (1 + µ, σ2)
and consider an agent with a power utility u(D) = D(1−γ)/1 − γ. In this case, the
asset return volatility, σ, the agent’s risk-aversion, γ, and the initial durables in stock
D0 are all important variables that affect the optimal consumption plan D
∗
p. The
model predicts that the optimal consumption plan D∗p decreases with asset return
volatility. Intuitively, a holder of risky assets chooses to set his consumption plan
below the expected level of wealth in order to achieve a higher probability that the
plan will be implemented successfully. However, the high volatility of asset returns
makes the distribution of expected wealth more dispersed, so the probability of suc-
cessful implementation is less sensitive to a change in Dp. Hence, asset payoffs are
more volatile, the consumption plan has to be reduced by a greater magnitude. I
also predict that D∗p increases with the initial durables in stock (1 − δ)D0. Given
the tradeoff between the probability of implementation and consumption level upon
implementation, a consumer with a larger initial endowment of durables in stock feels
less upset about missing a new purchase opportunity. Hence, the lower probability of
plan implementation is of less concern, and the planned consumption can be set at a
higher level. Finally, a higher level of risk aversion, γ, leads to a more conservative
plan. When γ is increased, the marginal utility at Dp is smaller, and therefore it is
less costly for the consumer to lower plan Dp in exchange for a higher success rate.
Thus the consumer would optimally choose a more conservative plan Dp.
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1.3.2 Implications for the Risk Premium
In addition to explaining the relation between consumption growth and volatility,
my model provides new predictions for the equity risk premium. Proposition 2 and
Corollary 1 of this subsection show that uncertainty of asset payoffs decreases the
consumer’s expected utility and generates a risk premium in the market. The unique
feature of my model that distinguishes it from previous work is that the risk premium
exists even if the utility u(·) is linear in consumption.
Proposition 2 (Utility Loss) Suppose a consumer has a continuous utility func-
tion u(·) with u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0, then his expected utility is lower when he holds
a risky asset than when he holds a risk-free asset with the same expected return.19
The finding that a consumer dislikes payoff uncertainty is not surprising; most
asset pricing models find a similar result. However, the mechanism in this paper’s
analysis is different. In most current models, the expected utility of the agent is
lower when he holds risky assets because of Jensen’s inequality. In other words, risky
asset pays well when the marginal utility of the agent is low and pays poorly when
it is high. This implies that the variation in marginal utility, which comes from the
concavity of the utility function, is crucial for obtaining this result. In contrast, my
model generates the same prediction even if the utility function u(·) is linear. In fact,
the consumer’s utility loss due to payoff uncertainty can be decomposed into two
components in my model. First, pre-budgeting restricts future consumption of the
agent. Specifically, the agent cannot consume more than he planned previously and
also can consume only durables in stock if the realized investment return is insufficient
to implement the consumption plan. Because consumption cannot exceed the realized
wealth, wealth is underutilized in most future states. This waste of wealth exists as
19Mathematical proof is available in appendix.
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long as the intratemporal utility function u(·) is non-decreasing.20 Second, similar
to the traditional models, the concavity of the utility function u(·) further reduces
the expected utility through Jensen’s inequality. Obviously, this effect does not exist
when a linear utility function is considered.
In order to discuss the comparative statics, I consider a consumer with a power
utility who holds a risky asset with a normally distributed return. The difference
in expected utility of a consumer between holding risky portfolio and holding the
risk-free asset depends on the volatility of investment return, σ, the consumer’s pref-
erences, described by parameter γ, as well as durables in stock, D0. Recall that the
volatility of asset returns reduces the expected utility of the consumer through two
effects: the Jensen’s inequality and wasted wealth. Obviously, the first effect is more
pronounced when volatility goes up. However, the second effect is also amplified by
volatility σ. In particular, the optimal consumption plan D∗p becomes more conserva-
tive when volatility increases, which in turns leads to more wasted wealth. Overall,
higher volatility lowers the expected utility of the consumer. In addition, as in the
20It is a somewhat unrealistic assumption of the model that the unplanned component of wealth is
completely wasted. In reality, unused wealth can be consumed in an inefficient way or can generate
utility through a bequest. But in any case, the unplanned consumption generates a lower utility than
when the same amount of expenditure is planned in advance. Therefore, the qualitative results of the
model are not changed by this simplifying assumption. In the intertemporal model that I develop in
Section IV, I allow the consumer to save unused money for the next period. I show that the utility
loss is then generated by a delay in consumption or inefficiency in the consumption/investment
allocation rather than by a waste of wealth. Another alternative is to set up the model in a two-
good economy and require one of the consumption goods to be pre-budgeted. In this case, all the
qualitative results discussed here still holds as long as the two consumption goods are not perfect
substitutes. In the two-good model, unplanned money will not be wasted but spent on the free-
adjusted good. However, the inefficiency of consumption allocation to the two goods plays the same
role as the waste of money does in the current one-good model.
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classical models, the expected utility at time 1 with respect to wealth realizations de-
pends on the curvature of the utility function, which is represented by parameter γ.
The difference in expected utility between holding a risky asset and a risk-free asset is
magnified as γ goes up. Finally, a larger initial stock of durables, (1− δ)D0, reduces
the exposure of the consumer’s future wealth to shocks from investment returns. As a
result, durables in stock have exactly the opposite effect from that of volatility, which
means that expected utility increases with the initial durables in stock.
Other things being equal, the expected utility of the consumer increases with the
expected return of the investment asset. Therefore, the following corollary can be
directly obtained from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 (Risk Premium) Suppose a consumer has a continuous utility func-
tion u(·) with u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0, then he is indifferent between holding a risky
asset and holding a risk-free asset only if the expected return of the risky asset is
higher than that of the risk-free asset.
The difference in expected utility between holding a risky asset and a risk-free
asset will be eliminated in a market through the price of risk. As a result, the
comparative statics on expected utility discussed above can be used to make several
predictions for the risk premium. In my setting, the risk premium of an asset increases
with its volatility and the intratemporal risk-aversion of investors, and it decreases
with the initial amount of durables in stock. This means that the equity premium is
predictable if the market return volatility or the aggregate consumption varies over
time.
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1.3.3 Numerical Examples
To better illustrate the model’s predictions, I present here a simple numerical
example. I assume that the gross return of the asset is normally distributed R˜ ∼
N (1 + µ, σ2) and model an agent with a power utility u(D) = D(1−γ)/1 − γ. I
use these assumptions in the rest of the paper because they allow for better model
tractability and are commonly used in the current literature.
To convey the main points more efficiently, I assign trivial values to some pa-
rameters. Without loss of generality, the initial wealth W0 and price of durable
consumption p are both normalized to 1, and the depreciation rate δ is set to 0.21
In the first numerical example, I assign parameter values that match the annual
equity market returns, D0 = 1, γ = 5, µ = 1.08, and σ = 0.20. In Figure 1.1, I plot
expected utility at time 1 vs. the choice of consumption plan Dp. The concavity of
the plotted function reflects the tradeoff between the higher probability of a successful
plan implementation and a potential increase in consumption. When consumption
plan is low, the future utility is also low. When the plan is high, however, the plan
implementation often fails because it requires a high investment return. The optimal
consumption plan therefore lies in-between. In the example, the optimal consumption
plan is 1.70 and the corresponding expected utility is −0.036. With the consumer’s
21Depreciation rate is not a parameter of interest in the two-period model because it is always pos-
sible to adjust level D0 to (1−δ)D0 if a certain depreciation level is desired. In the appendix, I prove
that the value function V0(W0, D0) is homogenous of degree 1 − γ and the maximizer D∗p(W0, D0)
is homogenous of degree 1. That means, the value of the max utility increases exponentially with
wealth W0 and the optimal consumption expenditure increases linearly with W0. Therefore I assume
W0 = 1 without loss of generality. The optimal consumption plan conditioned on W0 = 1 can be
also interpreted as the proportion of total wealth to be spent.
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expected net worth of D0 +W0µ = 1 + 1.08 = 2.08, the consumption plan D
∗
p of 1.70
is therefore conservative, as stipulated in Proposition 1.
To examine the effect of asset payoff uncertainty, let us call the consumer in the
above case consumer A and assume that consumer B holds a risk-free asset that
pays the same rate of return, 1.08. Hence consumers A and B have the same level
of initial wealth and the same expectation of future wealth. According to (1.2),
consumer B chooses to consume the expected wealth of 2.08 and earns (expected)
utility of −0.013, which is much higher than consumer A’s expected utility. The
comparison shows that the uncertainty of asset payoffs lowers the expected utility of
its holder. In equilibrium, market clearing will increase the return of risky asset or
suppresses the risk-free rate, which means a risk premium must exist.
Second, I solve the model at different levels of volatility σ while holding the rest
of parameters steady. The optimal consumption plan D∗p and expected utility are
plotted against values of σ in Figure 1.2. Note that the dashed lines represent the
consumption plan and the expected utility of a consumer who holds the risk-free
asset In Panel A, increasing σ induces more conservative consumption plans. Panel
B shows that expected utility also declines with an increase of the volatility of asset
returns.
In addition to σ, D0 is also a parameter of interests. The model predicts that
both the purchase plan and expected utility increase with D0. Figure 1.3 displays the
predictions by showing an ascending trend for purchase plan Dp−D0 and increasing
expected utility along D0. Here I show the purchase plan Dp − D0 vs. D0 instead
of Dp vs. D0, because the increment of Dp may be attributed to the fact that D0
increases the consumer’s net worth. To disentangle this from the wealth factor, it is
informative to look at the purchase plan Dp − D0. In addition, higher D0 leads to
higher expected utility due to the same wealth effect. This is shown for the risk-free
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case in Panel B. Comparing the risk-free and the risky case, I find that the difference
in expected utility in these two cases narrows down when D0 increases.
Last, I study the role of the intratemporal risk-aversion γ. In almost all classical
consumption models it is the most important parameter. Figure (1.4) shows that it
also matters here, and a high value leads to a more conservative plan.22
I visualize the model predictions for the risk premium by calculating the risk
premium of the risky asset with a normally-distributed return (see Figure 1.5). It is
reasonable to consider this risky asset as the market portfolio because the volatility
mimics the equity market return. Thus, in the following paragraphs, the risk premium
is also called equity premium . I calculate the equity premium here in the following
way. Assuming a risk free rate of 2% per year, the expected market return of the
risky asset has to be high enough to compensate for its uncertainty such that people
are indifferent between holding a market portfolio or receiving the risk-free rate.23 In
other words, given that market return has volatility of 20% per year, I want to find
its expected return which matches its certainty equivalence to the risk-free rate. The
variation in the premium shown in the figure perfectly reflects our predictions except
in its magnitude.24 Due to the limitation of the two-period setting, the magnitude of
the risk premium is not very informative. For example, in the two-period model, the
wealth wasted cannot be utilized at all whereas in reality people may be able to use
22Here I do not show expected utility with respect to γ as I do for σ and D0, because a change
in γ leads to changes in the utility function. Since “utility function” is a relative concept, it is not
economically meaningful to discuss how changes in γ move the expected utility.
23Unfortunately, I cannot solve the risk-free rate and equity return together because there is no
adjustment for current consumption in this model.
24For example, the equity premium in the example at the beginning of this section is as high as
48% and all the numbers in Figure 1.5 are astonishingly high.
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it less efficiently or save it for future use. Hence I address only the qualitative feature
only in this section and leave the magnitude-related questions to next section.
Besides the trends of equity premium, one more qualitative feature worth noting is
the positive value when γ = 0; i.e., the risk premium does not rely on the curvature of
the intra-temporal utility function. As discussed in subsection 1.3.1.3.2, risk-aversion
or an aversion to asset payoff uncertainties can exist because of the waste of wealth
when the consumer’s future wealth is uncertain. To demonstrate this point, I replicate
the previous example with a linear utility function. I set D0 = 1, µ = 1.08, σ = 0.20
as before, but γ = 0. Similar to the case with positive γ, the consumption plan is
conservative. Dp is solved to be 1.85 (which is smaller than the expected wealth of
2.08) and the expected utility is 1.74. In comparison with risk-free case in which
utility is 2.08, the consumer is obviously harmed by holding the risky asset. With the
consumption plan Dp = 1.85, I am able to sketch the future consumption for each
asset return realization as in Figure 1.6. The realized wealth is far from fully utilized
in almost all the states of the asset return. In contrast, a consumer holds a risk-
free asset does not waste any of his wealth because he can perfectly plan his future
consumption without any concerns about uncertainty. Thus the waste of wealth leads
directly to the inferiority of risky assets.
1.4 Optimization in an Intertemporal Model
So far I have shown that the optimal consumption plan is determined by a tradeoff
between a higher success rate of plan implementation and a higher utility level upon
implementation. I also find that in a two-period model, the holder of risky asset
chooses to set his plan for future consumption below his expected wealth. However,
the unrealistically large equity risk premium generated by the two-period model re-
veals the limits of modeling the real world according to such a simple setting. For
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example, in real life there should no wasted wealth. People are able to save any un-
used money to spend later. Therefore, I develop an intertemporal model that allows
for more realistic assumptions. The advantage of the intertemporal model is that I
can calibrate it and use it to make quantitative predictions.
There is an infinite-lived representative agent in the economy. He has an intratem-
poral utility u(D) = D
1−γ
1−γ for service flows generated by durable consumption goods.
The consumer maximizes the expected lifetime utility given by
max E
∞∑
t=0
βt
D1−γt
1− γ
where β is the time-preference of the consumer. γ measures the relative risk-aversion
of the consumer, when he is allowed to adjust consumption instantaneously, as well as
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. I use this utility function form to retain
the model tractability but the intuition is applicable to a more general setting such
as Epstein-Zin utility.
There are risky investment assets available for saving. The investment returns,
denoted by the vector R˜, are exogenously given. This is an abstraction from a produc-
tion economy where firms are invested in by households and the outputs are subject
to stochastic productivity shocks. The risk-free rate is denoted by Rf .
The agent enters each period with wealth Wo, already-owned durables in stock Do,
as well as a consumption plan Dp that is ready to implement immediately. Besides his
portfolio allocation a on investment assets, he is faced with two decisions. First, for
the current period consumption D, he can choose between adjusting his consumption
to Dp or consuming only the durables in stock Do. Let W
′
o denote his initial wealth
for next period, then budget constraint can be written as
W˜o
′ = (Wo − p(D −Do))(aT R˜ + (1− aT1)Rf ). (1.4)
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Unlike in the two-period model, this budget constraint replaces the previous re-
striction on implementing a purchase if his wealth is not great enough to pay for
it.
The consumer’s second decision is to choose a consumption plan D′p for the next
period. At the beginning of next period, his durables in stock depreciate by δ and
his investment return realizes. He repeats the two consumption decisions with his
new state described by D′o, W
′
o and D
′
p. Since every period is the same for the
representative agent, his optimization problem can be written in a Bellman Equation
as follow:
V (Wo, Do, Dp) = max{D∈{Do,Dp},a,D′p}
D1−γ
1− γ + βEV (W˜o
′, D′o, D
′
p)
s.t. Do
′ = (1− δ)D,
W˜o
′ = (Wo − p(D −Do))(aT R˜ + (1− aT1)Rf ).
(1.5)
where p is the price of durable goods, 1 is a vector of ones. The last constraint
is the transition equation for wealth. Wealth in the next period depends on the
expense/revenue from durables adjustment and the investment return for this period,
which introduces the uncertainty of future wealth. Unlike in the two-period model,
the wealth left after a purchase can be invested and used for future consumption. As
a result, the goal of the consumption adjustment plan here is to achieve a favorable
consumption wealth relationship in the next period without expending all wealth.
This optimal relation of consumption and wealth reflects the balance between the
investment earnings and the consumer’s time-preference on consumption, so will not
be as extreme as in the two-period model. Therefore, the consumer may want to
adjust consumption up or down depending on the current state and the optimal
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consumption level, whereas in the two-period model the desire to spend all the cash
assures any reduction of consumption to be suboptimal.
1.4.1 The Solution for a Single-Asset Economy and Implications
Here I discuss an economy with only one risky asset in order to confirm the qual-
itative results shown in the two-period model. In this economy, there is one risky
asset available, so I can call it the market portfolio. I assume its return is indepen-
dently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) in each period and follows the distribution
N (1 + µ, σ2) with µ = 0.08 and σ = 0.15.
With only the market portfolio available, the agent’s portfolio choice is trivial and
thus I can focus on his consumption policy. The optimization problem is observed
to be homogeneous in the initial wealth Wo with degree of 1 − γ; hence the optimal
choices do not depend on the initial wealth level and our discussion can be based on
ratios normalized by wealth. For example, an initial durables ratio can be defined
as do =
Do
Wo
. Note that Wo and Do are the states of the agent at the beginning of
one period, and his consumption of this period is subject to the implementation of
his plan Dp. So his consumption-wealth ratio in this period has to be defined as
d = D
W
where D is how much he consumes and W = Wo − p(D −Do) is the money
invested in this period. When the agent chooses not to adjust his consumption or
his wealth limits him from adjusting his consumption, his consumption-wealth ratio
is unchanged from the initial value: i.e., d = do. Otherwise they are different.
The solution is found numerically. Because of the multi-dimensionality of states
and choice variables, it is not straightforward to show and understand the solution.
As a reminder, in each period, the consumer has to make two decisions regarding his
consumption. He has to decide whether to implement his current consumption plan
Dp and he has to choose a future consumption plan D
′
p. The two decisions are made
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simultaneously and are closely related to each other. Specifically, the implementation
decision will determine the amount of wealth left for investment in this period, so the
future expenditure has to be planned accordingly. On the other hand, the implemen-
tation decision alters not only the current period consumption, but also the feasible
set of future consumption possibilities. So the consumer has to consider the effect
of implementation on future utility, which also relies on his consumption planning of
next period. However, in spite of these complications, the two consumption decisions
serve one purpose, which is to smooth the consumption.25 In the rest of this subsec-
tion, I discuss how these two decisions are made in different states with the spirit of
consumption smoothing.
Plans are not always implemented as illustrated in Figure 1.7, where the imple-
mentation policy is shown as a scattered plot. Because the consumer’s optimization
problem is homogeneous in Wo, only two state variables (i.e.,
Do
Wo
and Dp
Wo
) are crucial.
The x-axis is ordered by Do
Wo
which is the amount of consumption in stock, and the
y-axis corresponds to the consumption plan Do
Wo
, which is optional to implement. For
each state, if the consumption plan is implemented, its corresponding spot is marked
as a dark(blue) point, otherwise blank. The two-dimensional state space is marked
by two blue triangles approximately and there is a critical point at the conjunction
of the two triangles. No sales plan (i.e., Dp < D0) is implemented to the left of the
critical point and no purchase plan is implemented to the right of this point. At the
critical point, no plan will be considered for implementation. I call this critical point
the ideal ratio, since a consumer does not want to adjust his consumption when he
25Consumption smoothing, or keeping a stable consumption-wealth ratio, is the key element
of utility maximization because power utility is assumed here. When other utility function as-
sumed, a smoothed consumption might not be the preferred. But as long as there exists a preferred
consumption-wealth relation corresponding to the utility, the results of this paper hold.
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enters a period with consumption-wealth ratio at this value.26 As seen in the two
blue triangles, the consumer tries to get as close to the ideal ratio as possible, when
the ideal ratio is not granted to him at the beginning of the period. In particular,
he implements the plan only if the consumption-wealth ratio after implementation is
not farther away from the ideal ratio.27 Therefore, the closer to the ideal ratio one
period starts, the fewer helpful plans there are.
One can also find two main differences related to the implementation policy be-
tween the intertemporal model and the two-period model. First, a sales plan can be
valuable in the intertemporal model because a consumer may want to reduce con-
sumption and save for the future. In a two-period model, saving cannot lead to any
additional utility so a sales plan is never optimal. Nevertheless, a sales plan is still
not as valuable as purchase plans. Note that in Figure 1.7, the triangle on the right is
much thinner than the one on the left. That is because consumption good deprecia-
tion keeps the consumption-wealth decline over time, hence high consumption-wealth
ratio may correct itself naturally in the next period. So a high consumption-wealth
ratio is less harmful than a low consumption-wealth ratio. In other words, sales plans
can be partially substituted by depreciation.
26I do not call it the “optimal ratio” because the word “optimal” usually refers to the solution of
an optimization problem. Hence an optimal ratio should be a feasible value of a choice variable. In
the setting of this paper, the consumption-wealth ratio is not always fully in control due to the pre-
budgeting requirement. Therefore, the ideal ratio is not always achievable although the consumer
tries his best to get close.
27The state variable
Dp
Wo
can be misleading if one takes it as the consumption-wealth ratio after
Dp is implemented. However, note that when consumption switches from Do to Dp, wealth will
change from Wo to W = Wo− p(Dp−Do). Thus the new consumption-wealth ratio DpW < DpWo when
a purchase plan is implemented, and
Dp
W >
Dp
Wo
for sales. Had it been displayed in a graph similar
to Figure 1.7 but rescale y-axis with post-implementation ratio
Dp
W , the marked area would look
narrower along the y-axis.
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More importantly, when we assume the consumer has to hold a positive share of
the market portfolio, his budget constraint imposes that Wo ≥ Dp − Do. However,
the financial constraint Wo ≥ Dp − Do of the optimization problem is not binding
in the intertemporal model. Recall that in the two-period model, the financial con-
straint is extremely distressing because it is the only factor that keeps the consumer
from consuming as much as possible. Here, however, the consumption-smoothing
motivation plays a more important role in keeping the consumption below a certain
level. Therefore, a consumer might abandon his purchase plan either to smooth the
consumption or in response to the financial constraint. Checking the boundaries in
Figure 1.7, one can see that the consumer abandon the purchase plan before a binding
financial constraint takes effect. In fact, the financial constraint Wo ≥ Dp − Do is
equivalent to Dp
Wo
− Do
Wo
≥ 1. If the financial constraint is binding, the upper boundary
of the blue area should fall on the line y = x + 1. However, in Figure 1.7 the real
boundary is far below y = x+ 1.28
More interesting than the implementation decision, is the consumption plan-
ning decision. To better illustrate the optimal consumption planning, I focus on
the relation between the agent’s consumption-wealth ratio and his planned future
consumption-wealth ratio (see Figure 1.8). Several relevant variables need to be
constructed in order to facilitate my discussion. As defined earlier, the agent’s
consumption-wealth ratio d is the ratio after he completes the consumption adjust-
ment in the current period. Several aspects of this ratio deserves attention. Together
with the uncertainty of investment payoffs, it decides the future initial consumption-
wealth ratio.29 Meanwhile, his plan for future consumption-wealth ratio can be in-
28I do not plot y = x + 1. Had it been plotted, it would be found far from the current scope in
Figure 1.7.
29Thus it is comparable to the D0 in the two-period model.
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ferred from D′p and W . However, his future consumption-wealth ratio is not fully in
his control, as his future wealth will depends on investment returns, as well as whether
he would implement D′p. To focus on the aim of his consumption plan, I define his
intended consumption-wealth ratio d′i as the ratio when the investment return realizes
at its expectation and D′p is implemented. It is mathematically derived as
d′i =
D′p
1 + µW − (D′p −D(1− δ))
where the denominator reflects the cost or income of adjusting consumption to D′p in
the next period.
How should one evaluate the agent’s consumption plan based on his intended
consumption-wealth ratio d′i? Recall that in the two-period model, conservative plan-
ning means that the consumer does not aim to spend all his wealth when the expected
return is realized. In the two-period model, there is no benefit from holding any cash
at the end of the period, so ideally (or if no uncertainty exists in his wealth), the agent
would like to consume all of his investment payoffs. In the intertemporal model, in
contrast, the ideal level of consumption is decided differently; holding cash has the
benefit of generating investment revenues. I solve the ideal consumption-wealth ratio
by finding the agent’s intended consumption-wealth ratio when the asset return is
1 + µ without uncertainty in the current period.30 Then I can compare whether the
agent aims at the ideal level when he is faced with uncertainty in the future.31
30I call this ratio as the “ideal ratio” because the agent does not have full control over his future
consumption-wealth ratio.
31Note that the procedure for computing the ideal level is similar to the risk-free case in the
two-period model, however I assume that the risk-free asset exists only in the current period instead
of assuming that it exists forever. The reason is that the long-run existence of risk-free asset will
change the economy. In a different economy, the value function will be changed, and thus the
intended consumption-wealth ratio will no longer be comparable to that in an economy with one
risky asset only.
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As shown in Figure 1.8, the ideal ratio is constant even though the current
consumption-wealth ratio varies from 0.15 to 0.27. This is not unexpected. When the
agent’s future wealth is known, he is able to plan and implement the next period’s con-
sumption at the exact optimal level. In other words, the future consumption-wealth
ratio can be chosen freely regardless of the current state. Given the homogeneity of
the optimization problem, the optimal level of consumption must be proportional to
wealth, which means the consumption-wealth ratio will be chosen at an unique level.
Therefore, to maximize his future value function, he would keep the consumption-
wealth ratio constant.
Nonetheless, the agent holding a market portfolio does not aim his future consumption-
wealth ratio at the ideal level. He plans conservatively all the time. It means he aims
at a low consumption-wealth ratio when he starts with a consumption-wealth ratio
lower than the ideal level, and a high consumption-wealth ratio when his current
ratio is above ideal. The reason for this conservative deviation is very similar to the
tradeoff in the two-period model. Although in this model there is no wasted wealth,
failure to implement a purchase will still lead to utility loss because the consump-
tion is postponed. Therefore, making a consumption plan in this model still entails
a tradeoff between coming closer to optimal consumption and a successful rate of
adjustment. It means the consumer plans conservatively as in the two-period model.
Therefore the main intuition and implications of the two-period model are qual-
itatively preserved in this model. Similar predictions can be generated with the
corresponding economic variables. As the roles of σ and γ remain the same in this
model, they should increase the distance between the intended plan and the ideal
ratio. The role of D0 in the two-period model is replaced by the current distance
between the consumption-wealth ratio and the ideal ratio. Therefore, as shown in the
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graph, the closer the current ratio is to the ideal level, the closer the intended ratio
is to the ideal value.
Moreover, one implication is that a risk premium exists even when linear intratem-
poral utility is adopted. As interpreted in the two-period model, the risk premium is
generated because wealth is subject to waste while a risky asset is held. Similarly, the
risk premium in this model is generated because of the unavoidable deviation from
the ideal consumption level. Inflexible adjustment exposes holders of risky assets to
the risk of either delaying consumption or over-consume when the return does not
realize around it expected value.
1.4.2 Dynamics of Consumption
In addition to identifying the implications for asset prices, it is interesting and
important to discuss the dynamics of consumption growth in the model. In this
subsection, I introduce the predictions of my models for consumption growth and its
relation to market return. For demonstration purposes, I simulate an investor who
starts with the ideal consumption-wealth ratio. Because I use the same parameter
values as in the previous subsection, the same solution is obtained for the investor’s
dynamic consumption decisions. I model the consumer’s decisions for a time-series
of simulated market returns and display the properties of the ex post consumption
growth. A large-sample simulation is conducted and summarized in Table 1.1. Table
1.3 documents empirical estimations from historical data as a complement to Table
1.1. To help demonstrate the mechanism, I use real annual asset returns from 1927
to 2012 as the simulated asset returns and show the consumption path in Figure 1.9.
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The corresponding summary statistics of this consumption path can be found in the
first line of Table 1.1.32
In a risky economy, a market portfolio holder in my model almost never arrives
at his ideal consumption-wealth ratio, as shown in Panel 2 of Figure 1.9. This is also
part of how my model differs from the canonical model and models with consump-
tion adjustment cost, such as Grossman and Laroque (1990) and Chetty and Szeidl
(2010).33 Even when the investor starts with an ideal consumption level, he cannot
ensure his later consumption at the ideal level. In the model, no matter how well he
plans for adjustments, his period-2 consumption is restricted to two specific levels:
his old durables in stock or his planned consumption. In period 2 the shock of invest-
ment return will drive him away from his optima unless the realized investment return
is exactly its expectation. More important, once his consumption-wealth ratio is no
longer ideal, he will schedule a consumption plan lower than the ideal level because ad-
32Here there are two reasons that I use the realized market return as an experiment. First, it is
easier for curious reader to compare with the historical consumption growth. Secondly, the realized
market return is not strictly the same as a normal distribution, for example, there are the well-
known fat tails, whereas I simulate asset returns from normal distributions only. Therefore, the
ex post consumption growth might exhibit different features. There are different advantages of
looking at realized market return vs. simulated normal returns. Since the investor’s consumption
strategy is solved under the normality solution, it is preferred to look at normally-distributed asset
returns when model consistency is of concern. However, I can only observe the consumption growth
corresponding to the realized market returns. So it might be interesting to take a look at the realized
market returns. Therefore I choose to bear with the inconsistency or resolve to bounded-rationality
assumption on the investor.
33In the canonical model, the optimal level of consumption is always maintained because con-
sumption can be freely and immediately adjusted. In Grossman and Laroque (1990) and Chetty
and Szeidl (2010), the consumer incurs the adjustment cost and returns to the optimal level every
couple of periods.
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justment plans are made conservatively. After he experiences a large positive wealth
shock at the beginning of period 2, he would be able to implement his consumption
purchase plan from period 1 but still end up with consumption lower than the ideal
level. As shown in Figure 1.9, he never returns to the ideal consumption-wealth level
afterward.34
Note that the consumption growth is relatively persistent after period 1. In period
2, with the conservative plan discussed in subsection 1.4.1.4.1, the low consumption-
wealth ratio leads the investor to aim at another lower-than-ideal consumption-wealth
ratio. Therefore his consumption level at period 3 is also low. With the same argu-
ment, the low consumption in period 3 may also extend to low consumption in the
next period, and so on and so forth until one or more reverse shocks in the market
bring the consumption-wealth ratio to the opposite side of the ideal line. Therefore,
because of the conservative consumption plan, a large wealth shock will translate
to a series of smaller and persistent innovations in consumption growth. The graph
shows similar consumption patterns after large shocks at several places, such as period
49 and period 77. As a result, the autocorrelation of consumption growth here is a
slightly positive 0.04 as reported in Table 1.1 (0.10 when the market returns are boot-
strapped) while the annual market return does not exhibit significant autocorrelation
(−0.01).35
34Therefore, in this model, the variations in the consumption-wealth ratio may not be solely
attributed to innovations in expected consumption growth and market return as in Lettau and
Ludvigson (2002). As shown in Figure 1.9 Panel 2, the pre-budgeting friction itself is able to drive
large variations in the consumption-wealth ratio.
35The persistence of consumption growth is another feature that distinguishes my model from
other consumption-based models. In the canonical model, consumption growth always matches
equity returns exactly. In models with adjustment costs, consumption growth is also expected to
be i.i.d.. Autocorrelation of aggregate consumption growth is generated in several papers, including
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While a large positive shock to asset return leads to a series of small increases of
consumption growth, a large reverse shock does not. In Panel A of Figure 1.9, when
a reverse shock happens at period 31, consumption growth responds immediately
in the same period. This asymmetry in response leads to a negative skewness of
consumption growth. In fact, consumption in stock depreciates as fast as 0.24 per
period. Thus a large reduction in consumption can be completed passively, i.e.,
foregoing a consumption purchase plan. Indeed, in 14 years of large reductions in
consumption, only once was it done by actively implementing a sale plan.36 In the
other 13 years, the investor simply let his consumption decline through depreciation.
Therefore, the skewness of consumption growth is closely related to the depreciate
rate δ in the model. As δ grows from a small value, the skewness of consumption
growth goes further negative. However, when δ grows too much beyond the market
return, the skewness pulls back. When the consumption depreciates too fast, the
magnitude of passive adjustment would be too large relative to wealth shocks. The
negative skewness of consumption growth has been documented in the literature, for
example Yang (2011), but studies have rarely provided an explanation.
The most interesting factor related to consumption growth might be its volatility,
because it has been stressed in the literature from time to time. It is an issue whenever
the question is how people react to wealth shocks or how risk is priced accordingly.
In the simulation, I can see that consumption moves along a smoother path than
the market; its standard deviation is about 25% lower than the market return. As I
Caballero (1990), Caballero (1993), Lynch (1996) and Gabaix and Laibson (2001), through the
aggregation of individual actions. But these are not based on a representative agent model. In
models of long-run risks, such as in Bansal and Yaron (2004), the autocorrelation is assumed at a
certain level but not derived from an optimal consumption choice.
36A large consumption reduction is defined as consumption growth< −0.2, which is one standard
deviation of the market returns.
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discussed earlier, large positive shocks to market returns are going to lead to a series
of small adjustments due to conservative consumption plans. Meanwhile, residual
consumption demand after a large shock might be canceled out by a reverse shock in
future periods before it is realized in consumption growth. These two effects together
smooth the impact of wealth spikes on consumption growth.3738
Next I turn my attention to the correlation of equity returns and consumption.
Note that equity returns are endogenously given in this simulation exercise, so the
correlation only measures how consumption responds to wealth shocks. At the first
glance, Panel A of Figure 1.9 seems to show a lagged market return. The corre-
lation of the simulated consumption growth and lagged market return is 0.73. In
other words, the equity return predicts future consumption growth in the short-run.
It is no surprising. Given that the immediate reaction to wealth shocks is limited
by the consumption planned made in the previous period, the investor has to delay
part of his consumption adjustment to the next period. On the other hand, while
instantaneous adjustment is prohibited in my model, there remains a moderate rela-
tionship between realized market return and contemporaneous consumption growth
(their correlation is 0.34 in the current example). A high market return leads to
implementation of the purchase plan or cancellation of the sale plan—i.e., to posi-
tive or zero consumption growth—while a low market return induces zero or negative
37Low consumption volatility is also generated as Grossman and Laroque (1990) and Chetty and
Szeidl (2010) through the financial adjustment cost of consumption. But their friction does not
lead to conservative adjustments as in my model. Instead, the duration between two adjustments is
prolonged to reduce the volatility of consumption growth.
38Note that financial constraints (wealth/cash cannot be negative) do not really play a role here.
Recall that in the last subsection, I showed that financial constraints are rarely binding. A consumer
will abandon his purchase plans when the purchase would drive him too far away from the ideal
consumption-wealth ratio, which always happens before a financial constraint is violated.
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consumption growth. Hence the model does allow the predictability of market return
on consumption growth but in a weak form. At the same time, the asymmetric re-
sponse of consumption to positive and negative shocks also leads to an asymmetric
correlation of consumption and market returns. Consumption co-moves with wealth
more during recessions than it does in expansionary times.39
Although correlation of consumption and equity is testable and observable, the
implications of my model cannot be easily distinguished from some of the prevailing
models. For example, lower contemporaneous correlation and short-run predictabil-
ity can both be achieved in a slow-reaction model or a heterogeneous-agents model.40
My model also has these disadvantages. For instance, these models are usually criti-
cized for their low-frequency performance. Similar to my model, the frictions carried
in these models always get weaker over longer horizons hence consumption is still
expected to co-move with wealth growth at low frequency. However, the literature
has documented a mismatch between consumption and wealth even for low-frequency
observations.41 For longer horizons, the impact of planning consumption one year
ahead is diluted in my model. The correlation of market return and consumption
growth drifts up gradually with the length of the horizons, moving from 0.34 over one
year to 0.76 over four years.
The preceding discussion of model predictions can be summarized by two groups
of observable statistics. First, the model predicts positive autocorrelation, negative
skewness, and low volatility. Second, the contemporaneous correlation of market re-
turn and consumption growth is low while a lagged market return might co-move with
39I do not discuss this prediction in statistics, because it is not easily quantified in a simple and
robust way.
40Caballero (1990), Caballero (1993), Lynch (1996) and Gabaix and Laibson (2001) all share this
feature or can be extended to generate this result.
41One example can be Cochrane and Hansen (1992).
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consumption growth. Since one simulation in Figure 1.9 might not be persuasive, I
have supplemented with a larger sample (see Table 1.1). Simulations are conducted
in three ways. First, as explained above, I input the historical market return directly.
Secondly, I generate 1000 time-series of simulated market returns with the same num-
ber of periods from a normal distribution. And last, I bootstrap market returns 1000
times from the historical annual returns, so that special features of market returns,
such as fat tails, are reserved in the simulated wealth shocks. Panel A reports simple
summary statistics for simulated market returns and their corresponding consumption
growth. Low standard deviation and negative skewness of consumption growth are
found uniformly in the three simulations.42 It is worth noting that negative skewness
does not rely on the skewness of the market return itself because it is found and strong
in the normal-distribution simulation. In contrast, autocorrelation of consumption
is not observed in the normal simulation, but found in the other two simulations,
because large shocks in market returns are necessary—i.e., fat tails of wealth shocks
are important. In Panel B, all the implications for low contemporaneous correlation
and short-run predictability between consumption and market return are confirmed
in the three pools.
Subsequently, I estimate the moments of consumption growth for historical data
1952–2012 and report in Table 1.3. Although the model used in this paper is based
on durables consumption, it may also have similar implications for non-durable and
other consumption which may also be subject to pre-budgeting friction. The total
consumption expenditure, non-durables consumption and durables consumption are
all considered in the table. Total consumption per capita is obtained directly from
Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) which includes personal expenditures
42Here we say the standard deviation is low whenever consumption growth is smoother than
simulated market returns. I compare it to the empirical estimation in the next paragraph.
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of non-durable goods, durable goods, and services. Personal expenditures on non-
durables goods and services are combined as non-durables consumption. Durables
consumption is constructed following Yogo (2006) and assumes that the depreciation
rate is 24% per year.4344 I choose a starting year of 1952, following Yogo (2006) and
Yang (2011), to avoid the unusual growth in durables consumption immediately after
WWII.45
As shown in Table 1.3, I find that consumption growth is highly autocorrelated
and negatively skewed, findings that are consistent with the documentation in Yang
(2011). For example, the first-order autocorrelation ranges from 0.31 to 0.69 and
skewness can be as low as -0.52 during the period 1952–2012. In comparison with
the results shown in Table 1.1 and 1.2, my model is sufficient to explain the negative
skewness and generate a third observed autocorrrelation. It is not surprising that my
model, in a representative agent setting, does not explain all the autocorrelations of
the aggregate consumption growth. As discussed in the literature, such as Gabaix
and Laibson (2001) and Lynch (1996), a large share of the autocorrelation might be
due to the aggregation of non-synchronous moves by all the agents.
Predictions for single-period cross-correlations of consumption growth and market
return in my model are well matched to the empirical observations. In the historical
data, the correlation is very low contemporaneously (nearly zero) and large when
43Yogo (2006) estimates the depreciation rate at 6% per quarter.
44Also note that, ideally, we should calculate total consumption as imputed durables consumption
plus the non-durables consumption. However, since the imputation of durables consumption magni-
fies the magnitude of expenditure, it would be over-weighted if we simply added it to non-durables
to obtain the total. However, the imputation is good for the purpose of calculating durables growth
rate, because the magnification of durables expenditure is proportionally thus does not deteriorate
its growth rate.
45In fact, it is pointed out in Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) that the durables consumption data in
the period 1947–1951 is subject to unusual restocking growth immediately after WWII.
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lagged market return is considered (0.29 to 0.57). The same pattern has been found
in simulations, although the observed correlation is slightly higher in the simulation.
Two limitations of my model show up when one compares Tables 1.1, 1.2 and
1.3. First, although the volatility of consumption growth is lower relative to market
volatility in my model, the observed volatility (0.01 to 0.04) is still much lower than
my model prediction (higher than 0.34). This again demonstrates the difficulty of
describing the behavior of aggregate consumption through a represent-agent model.
Aggregating individual consumption is not a trivial task and deserves careful con-
siderations as in Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Lynch (1996) and Caballero (1990).
Second, as discussed earlier, my model is not able to explain the low-frequency be-
havior of consumption growth. In the simulation, the correlation of market return
and consumption growth increases sharply from 0.34 over one year to 0.76 over four
years. In the real data, I find this correlation to be lower than 0.20 for all horizons
reported in Panel B of Table 1.3.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new friction for consumption adjustment over time. A
consumer cannot instantaneously adjust their consumption, but must plan for adjust-
ment in advance. I show that when this friction is modeled, the consumer chooses to
adjust consumption in a smooth way and exhibits aversion to holding risky assets.
Importantly, consumer prefers assets with lower volatility even if his intratemporal
utility is linear. One of the key theoretical results of my analysis is that a holder
of risky assets chooses to make conservative purchase plans, which results in sticky
consumption growth in the model. When a large shock to wealth arrives, a risky-asset
holder adjusts his consumption in small steps, and the reaction to a shock therefore
takes a long time to materialize. Because of this delayed reaction, the agent who
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holds risky assets can deviate from the ideal consumption-wealth ratio for multiple
periods, which lowers his utility relative to the risk-free case.
The endogenous consumption growth obtained in my model has properties that
are observed in the real data. In a representative-agent model, I am able to generate a
positive autocorrelation in consumption growth and a low correlation of consumption
growth with the contemporaneous market return, while the previous literature usually
obtains the same results only by modeling heterogeneous agents. My model also
generates negative skewness of consumption growth, which is observed in the historical
data but has not been explained by the existing literature.
My model also generates implications to asset prices. The pre-budgeting friction
distorts the consumption growth path and leads to utilty loss to the consumer. There-
fore, it generates a new source of risk premium in addtion to the classical model. This
risk premium exists even if a linear utility function is applied.
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Figure 1.1: The Consumer’s Objective Function in the One-Period Model.
Value of the objective function of the consumer in the one-period model is plotted as
a function of his choice of consumption plan Dp. Initial wealth W0 and the price of
durable consumption p are both normalized to 1, and the depreciation rate δ is zero.
The rest of parameters are set as follows: D0 = 1, γ = 5, µ = 0.08, and σ = 0.20.
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Figure 1.2: Consumption Plan and Expected Utility vs. Return Volatility.
This figure contains two graphs. Panel A is optimal consumption planDp as a function
of volatility in the consumer’s investment return σ. Panel B shows the corresponding
expected utility of the consumer for each value of σ. Assume δ = 0. Initial wealth
W0 and price of durable consumption p are both normalized to be 1. The rest of the
parameters are set as follows. D0 = 1, γ = 5 as the intratemporal utility function is
specified by a power utility, µ = 0.08. Dashed lines are for risk-free case, i.e. σ = 0
while keeping other parameters the same.
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Figure 1.3: Consumption Plan and Expected Utility v.s. Initial Durables in Stock.
Panel A displays how optimal consumption plan Dp varies with the initial durables
in stock D0. Panel B shows the corresponding expected utility that the consumer
can achieve. No depreciation is assumed, i.e. δ = 0. Initial wealth W0 and price of
durable consumption p are both normalized to be 1. The rest of the parameters are
set as follows. γ = 5 as the intratemporal utility function is specified by a power
utility, µ = 0.08 and σ = 0.20. Dashed lines are for risk-free case, i.e. σ = 0 while
keeping other parameters the same.
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Figure 1.4: Expected Utility v.s. Intratemporal Risk-Aversion.
The figure plots the optimal consumption plan Dp when different levels of intratem-
poral risk-aversion γ is assumed. The other parameters are set as follows. δ = 0.
Initial wealth W0 and price of durable consumption p are both normalized to be 1.
D0 = 1, µ = 0.08 and σ = 0.20. Dashed lines are for risk-free case, i.e. σ = 0 while
keeping other parameters the same.
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Figure 1.5: Comparative Statics of Equity Premium.
Equity Premium generated in the one-period model is shown in this figure. Pa-
rameters of interests, including the volatility of market return σ, intratemporal risk-
aversion γ and initial durables in stock D0 are chosen in corresponding ranges. For
the rest of the parameters, depreciation rate δ = 0, and initial wealth W0 and price
of durable consumption p are both normalized to be 1. Equity premium here is cal-
culated by equating the expected utility of a market portfolio holder and the risk-free
asset holder assuming that risk free rate 2% per year is exogenously given and σ is
the volatility of market return.
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Figure 1.6: Inefficient Utilization of Wealth with Uncertainty.
Consumption expenditure in states of investment return realization within five stan-
dard deviations are shown. Dashed line is the corresponding level of future wealth.
Investment return realizations. δ = 0. Initial wealth W0 and price of durable con-
sumption p are both normalized to be 1. The rest of the parameters are set as follows.
D0 = 1, γ = 5 in the power utility function, µ = 0.08 and σ = 0.20.
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Figure 1.7: Implementation of Consumption Plan under the Intertemporal Setting.
This figure shows us the consumer’s implementation decision when he enters a new
period with states (Wo,Do,Dp) in the intertemporal model. The states can be reduced
to a two-dimensional space - (Do
Wo
,Dp
Wo
). Implementation decision can be represent as
a binary variable which allows the function to be shown in a scattered plot as follow.
The x-axis is ordered by Do
Wo
which is the amount of consumption in stock, whereas
y-axis corresponds to the consumption plan Do
Wo
, which is optional to implement. In
the scattered plot, the dark(blue) part is referred to the states when consumption
plan Dp is implemented.
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Figure 1.8: Intended Consumption-Wealth Ratio of the Consumer.
Intended consumption-wealth ratio d′i is plotted as a function of current consumption-
wealth ratio d for a consumer modeled under the intertemporal setting. Both the
dashed line and dotted line are to mark the ideal ratio under the same set of pa-
rameters. d = D
W
where D is how much he consumes and W = Wo − p(D − Do) is
the money invested in this period. d′i =
D′p
1+µW−(D′p−D(1−δ)) which reflects the future
consumption-wealth ratio in case that the investment return realizes at its expecta-
tion and D′p is implemented. I solve the ideal consumption-wealth ratio by finding
the agent’s intended consumption-wealth ratio when the asset return is µ but without
uncertainty in the current period.
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Figure 1.9: Simulation of Consumption Growth.
Simulated time-series of consumption growth is displayed together with market re-
turns in Panel A. The corresponding dynamics of consumption-wealth ratio is plotted
in Panel B, where the dotted line marks the ideal consumption-wealth ratio. For the
initial period, I set the consumption-wealth at its ideal level. In this figure, I simply
used the real annual returns of market during 1927–2012 to replace the simulated as-
set returns for illustration purpose. Note that a larger sample of simulation exercise
is continued in table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statisitcs of Simulated Consumption Growth
Panel A reports the simple summary statistics of simulated market returns. Panel
B contains summary statistics of consumption growth. When the sample includes
more than one time-series, standard deviation of the statistics is reported below the
mean within a pair of parentheses. Acf1 is the first order autocorrelation.
Panel A: Simple Summary Statistics of Simuated Market Return
Mean STD Skewness Acf1
1927-2012 0.085 0.206 -0.261 -0.008
Simulation 0.080 0.150 -0.003 -0.013
(0.016) (0.012) (0.250) (0.106)
Bootstrap 0.085 0.204 -0.262 -0.009
(0.021) (0.014) (0.196) (0.106)
Panel B: Simple Summary Statistics of Consumption Growth
Mean STD Skewness Acf1
1927-2012 0.027 0.155 -0.461 0.041
Simulation 0.025 0.124 -0.618 -0.003
(0.013) (0.010) (0.206) (0.105)
Bootstrap 0.028 0.157 -0.373 0.100
(0.018) (0.011) (0.174) (0.104)
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Chapter 2
IS MARKET TIMING GOOD FOR SHAREHOLDERS?
2.1 Introduction
The question of whether managers can time the market in making share repurchase
and equity issuance decisions has been hotly debated in the literature.1 Yet, a more
important question that has not been addressed before is whether managers should
want to time the market. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by an-
alyzing wealth transfers between a firm’s selling, ongoing, and new shareholders that
are caused by market timing.2 Surprisingly, we find that in many instances success-
ful market timing does not benefit existing shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders
fare worse when the manager issues overpriced equity than when she repurchases
undervalued stock.
Our main insight is that current/existing shareholders are net sellers of a firm’s
stock and are affected by mispricing even if a firm does not issue or repurchase equity.
For example, current shareholders are already better off during a temporary overpric-
1Brockman and Chung (2001) and Dittmar and Field (2014) conclude that managers exhibit
substantial timing ability in executing repurchases. In survey of executives, Graham and Harvey
(2001), and Brav et al. (2005) find that the perception of mispricing is one of the most important
factors driving repurchase and issuance decisions. Additionally, a large literature documents stock
return patterns that could be symptomatic of market timing (Baker and Wurgler (2000); Jenter et al.
(2011); Ikenberry et al. (1995), and Loughran and Ritter (1995)). The market timing interpretation
of these results is disputed by Eckbo et al. (2000); Butler et al. (2005), and Dittmar and Dittmar
(2008).
2Throughout the paper, we focus on the distributional effects of market timing and do not consider
situations where it creates or destroys total value (e.g., by affecting a firm’s investment policy).
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ing because some of them are able to sell the stock at a higher price. To accurately
assess the effect of market timing, therefore, one needs to measure the incremental
changes in shareholder value that are caused by repurchase and issuance decisions.
Instead, financial economists have traditionally thought about the combined effect of
stock mispricing and firms’ actions triggered by this mispricing.
When we measure the net effect of firm’s market timing, we find that the casual
intuition is often wrong. For example, we show that a firm selling overpriced shares
can hurt its existing shareholders rather than investors buying these shares. This is
because by issuing additional equity, the firm conveys some of its negative informa-
tion to the market, which decreases the stock price. Furthermore, the firm is now
competing with its own shareholders for potential buyers of the stock. As a result, a
firm’s shareholders are able to sell fewer overpriced shares than they otherwise might
and also must sell them at a lower price. Both of these effects make the firm’s selling
shareholders worse off. As we further show in the model, all current shareholders
(who will become either selling or ongoing shareholders) can be worse off as a group.
But if the firm buys back its undervalued stock, current shareholders benefit at the
expense of new investors because the latter are able to buy fewer underpriced shares
and must buy them at a higher price.
We develop our argument by building a theoretical model in the rational expecta-
tions framework. In the model, we require only that prices reflect all publicly available
information–i.e., the investors recognize that the repurchase or equity sale conveys
news about stock mispricing–and that the market clears additional demand for or
supply of shares from the firm.3 A firm manager is endowed with private informa-
tion and can use it to trade on the firm’s behalf. All shareholders and new investors
3Specifically, we do not require any temporary market imperfections, such as liquidity dry-ups,
simultaneous trading, or price pressure.
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are fully rational: they can learn from the firm’s decisions and trade their stock
accordingly. Because some firms in the economy issue or repurchase equity for non-
informational reasons, the equilibrium is not fully revealing and informed managers
can take advantage of stock mispricing.
We show that the result of a firm’s equity market timing on existing shareholders
can be described by three effects–which we label as the quantity effect, the price
effect, and the long-term gain effect. The quantity effect appears because a firm’s
additional demand for shares must be accommodated by either current shareholders
or new investors. For example, suppose that, in a typical year, current shareholders
sell 1,000 shares to new investors. If the firm decides to repurchase 100 shares during
this year, it is plausible that current shareholders will have to sell 1,050 shares and new
investors will buy only 950. The quantity effect in this example reduces the wealth
of selling shareholders and new investors by the amount of mispricing multiplied by
50 shares. Because the quantity effect is a result of adverse selection, it negatively
affects all uninformed parties.
An important piece of intuition comes from the price effect, which takes place
because a firm’s decision to repurchase or issue stock conveys new information to the
market and permanently affects the stock price. Unlike the quantity effect, the price
effect creates asymmetric changes in the wealth of the firm’s current shareholders and
new investors. For example, the price drop at the announcement of a seasoned equity
offering (SEO) protects new investors from buying into an overpriced firm, but at the
same time it also decreases the expected profit of selling shareholders.
Finally, the long-term gain effect applies to those investors who hold the firm’s
stock until all information is revealed, i.e., ongoing shareholders and new investors
who join the firm. In particular, a share repurchase conducted by an informed man-
ager generates the trading profit for a firm and allows its stockholders to sell shares
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at a higher price in the future. Importantly, the extent to which current sharehold-
ers benefit from this effect depends on the magnitide of net selling because some
stockholders liquidate their positions before the long-term gain is realized.
The model generates two new results. First, we show that current sharehold-
ers prefer share repurchase timing to new issuance timing. This result is driven by
the price effect. Because current shareholders are net sellers, they benefit when the
firm corrects underpricing but sometimes prefer to leave overpricing uncorrected. We
demonstrate that the manager who wants to maximize current shareholder value will
use share repurchases more often than new equity sales. In particular, she will repur-
chase stock when it is fairly priced or even somewhat overpriced, but will not always
issue overvalued equity.4 Repurchases by informed managers will then be followed
by a smaller magnitude of abnormal returns and generate a smaller average profit
than new equity sales. Therefore, the continuing popularity of stock buybacks that
do not appear to exploit large undervaluation can be rationalized by the preference
of managers for current shareholders. To the best of our knowledge, this explanation
for repurchases has not been previously explored in the literature, and we view it as
complementary to the commonly cited motives of redeploying excess cash, managing
earnings, improving alignment between management and shareholders, and counter-
acting dilution from equity-based compensation plans.5
Second, we show that in many circumstances current shareholders are worse off
because of market timing. One such circumstance is when a firm issues overvalued
4Here it is important to see the difference between our study and the much simpler idea that share
repurchases raise the price for selling shareholders. First, the remaining shareholders are negatively
affected by excessive repurchases or repurchases made during the overpricing. More important, by
creating an additional demand for stock, a share repurchase changes the number of the firm’s selling
and remaining shareholders.
5See, e.g., Kahle (2002); Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Huang and Thakor (2013).
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stock and the mispricing is relatively small. In this case, the decrease in wealth
of selling shareholders caused by the price and quantity effects is larger than the
long-term gains to ongoing shareholders, so that current shareholders are collectively
worse off. Another situation when market timing is value destroying for current
shareholders is when the share turnover is relatively high. In this case, the wealth
of current shareholders always decreases with the timing of equity sales and can
also decrease with the timing of share repurchases. The intuition for this result
is that the high share turnover strips current shareholders of some long-term gains
and the quantity effect works against them. We show that in this situation current
shareholders prefer a manager who never times the equity market to a manager who
systematically responds to mispricing by issuing shares and repurchasing stock.
Determining how different shareholder groups are affected by market timing is not
only interesting in and of itself; it can also give us insights into the firm’s implicit
value maximization objectives. By observing how the manager of a particular firm
uses her information to time the market, it is possible to infer what shareholder
group’s wealth the manager really cares about. Given the theoretical predictions
of the model, the data suggest that an average large U.S. firm times the market
as if it were trying to create value for current shareholders. First, there are larger
post-event abnormal returns following equity issuances than following repurchases.
Specifically, over the period 1982-2010, the average three-year abnormal return after
seasoned equity offerings is −12.6%, but only 3.4% after repurchases. Second, the
average measure of profit from SEO timing is considerably larger than the profit from
repurchase timing. We document this result by using a new empirical measure of
profit from market timing, calculated as the additional return earned from equity
timing by a shareholder holding one share. The difference between issuance and
repurchase profits captures the imbalance in timing by a particular firm, with positive
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values indicating a relative preference by the manager for current shareholders. We
find that an SEO adds on average 0.37% in return to ongoing shareholders, while a
repurchase adds only 0.04%. Finally, it appears that repurchases are more frequent
than SEOs, with 36.8% of all firm-years posting a repurchase and 4.0% having an
SEO. These results do not support the view that the average firm acts in the interest
of ongoing or future shareholders, but are consistent with current shareholder value
maximization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief
overview of the literature. Section 2 solves for the equilibrium in the presence of
informed trading by a firm and analyzes wealth transfers between current shareholders
and new investors. The data sources and empirical results are described in Section 3.
The final section offers concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature Overview
Our model has its roots in the theoretical literature on share issuance and re-
purchase decisions under asymmetric information. There are two main differences
from prior work. First, most earlier studies do not focus on the welfare of existing
and new shareholders of a firm’s stock, which is at the heart of our theoretical anal-
ysis.6 Instead, related studies usually derive the manager’s optimal policy given a
particular objective function, such as maximizing a weighted average of the current
market price and expected intrinsic value (e.g., Persons (1994) and Ross (1977)). In
comparison with the approach in these papers, the maximization problem for current
shareholders in our model has variable weights; that is, the manager’s timing has an
6Lucas and McDonald (1990) do recognize that shareholders may disagree about the desired
equity issue policy. However, they further assume that there is a sufficient number of long-term
shareholders so that management acts in their interest.
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effect not only on the prices, but also on the number of current shareholders who will
sell stock at each date. Second, the prior literature often assumes shareholders and
other investors are passive. This assumption ignores the fact that shareholders and
investors who are able to learn from the firm’s decisions can optimally rebalance their
portfolios, which has a feedback effect on managerial decisions.
The literature on optimal issuance decisions usually analyzes a firm seeking ex-
ternal financing for new investment projects (see Heinkel (1982); Brennan and Kraus
(1987); Leland and Pyle (1977); Williams (1988); Myers and Majluf (1984), and
Morellec and Schurhoff (2011)). Our paper differs from this strand of literature be-
cause there is no investment in the model, and the issuance decisions are motivated
solely by mispricing. The repurchase signaling literature shows that stock repur-
chases can signal positive information to investors (see, e.g., Vermaelen (1981); Ofer
and Thakor (1987); Hausch and Seward (1993); Persons (1994), and Buffa and Nico-
dano (2008)).7 For example, in the model of Constantinides and Grundy (1989), a
manager can use a positive signal conveyed by repurchases to issue equity-like secu-
rities. These studies are not primarily concerned with the wealth transfers between
different groups of investors.
Two studies give special attention to conflict of interests between different groups
of shareholders in repurchases. Brennan and Thakor (1990) show that repurchases
lead to a wealth transfer from uninformed to informed shareholders. They argue
that since the costs of gathering information are larger for small shareholders, a
repurchase is expected to benefit large shareholders. Unlike Brennan and Thakor
7Signaling with both issuance and repurchases is explored in a number of structural dynamic
models. For example, Hennessy et al. (2010) build a dynamic equity signaling model, where signaling
is achieved through higher leverage and, consequently, higher bankruptcy costs. Bolton et al. (2013)
assume that firms exploit the opportunity to issue equity at a lower cost, but they also assume an
exogenous time-varying cost of financing.
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(1990), we assume that all of a firm’s investors and current shareholders have the
same information and that only the manager has access to private information. In
another study, Oded (2005) shows that repurchases can hurt those shareholders who
need to sell the mispriced stock after a liquidity shock.
Some of the earlier studies reach different conclusions than ours because they
assume that equity timing originates from differences in beliefs among investors rather
than from information (Huang and Thakor (2013) and Yang (2013)). Firms can
also take advantage of aggregate market mispricing (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) or
react with their repurchase and issuance decisions to a change in the overall business
environment (Dittmar and Dittmar (2008)). In contrast, the predictions of our model
are based on mispricing across firms.
Our study contributes to a large empirical literature that documents and explains
equity mispricing around new equity issuances and repurchases. For example, Iken-
berry et al. (1995) document positive abnormal returns following the announcement
of open market share repurchases and Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997) provide ev-
idence on the underperformance of firms conducting IPOs and SEOs. Additionally,
Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) document that share issuance exhibits a strong cross-
sectional ability to predict stock returns. Baker et al. (2007) provide a thorough
overview of this literature. We contribute to this line of research by developing a
new measure of profit from market timing. We also show that it is important to
simultaneously analyze repurchase and issuance decisions. For example, based on the
issuance data alone, a researcher cannot separate the manager’s timing ability from
her preferences.
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2.3 Model
2.3.1 Setup
In this section, we build a model of market timing based on the rational expecta-
tions framework of Grossman (1976). The economy is populated with a proportion
λ < 1/2 of firms that are controlled by informed managers who are able to time
the market (“timing firms”), and a proportion 1−λ of firms that sell and repurchase
equity for reasons that are unrelated to misvaluation. For example, firms might repur-
chase stock to distribute excess cash, manage earnings, adjust leverage, increase the
pay-performance sensitivity of employee contracts, or counteract the dilution from
exercises of employee stock options (Grullon and Michaely (2004); Skinner (2008),
and Babenko (2009)). Similarly, new equity issuance can be motivated by the need
to finance new investment. For example, DeAngelo et al. (2010) find that, without
SEO offer proceeds, 63% of issuers would run out of cash the year after an SEO.8
We assume that the demand for shares by firms that issue and repurchase equity
for exogenous reasons is normally distributed
F ∼ N(µu, σ2u). (2.1)
We show that it is possible to choose the parameters µu and σ
2
u in such a way that
investors who observe a manager’s actions cannot distinguish whether the demand
comes from an informed or uninformed manager (we use the same notation F for the
demand by the informed manager).9 Thus the equilibrium is not fully revealing, and
informed managers are able to take advantage of mispricing.
8Additionally, Hertzel et al. (2012) find that timing of SEOs can be determined by market
perception of a potential overinvestment problem, as opposed to equity mispricing.
9Formally, the distribution of demand by the informed managers is the same in equilibrium as
the exogenous distribution of demand by the uninformed managers. This assumption helps us to
significantly simplify the learning problem by individuals who observe firm action F , but do not
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Each timing firm is endowed with a risk-neutral manager who receives private
information at date 1 and can trade on the firm’s behalf. The true per share value of
the firm is drawn from a normal distribution and is realized at date 2
P2 ∼ N(P , σ2p). (2.2)
The manager has a noisy signal v about the future firm value and can use this infor-
mation to buy or sell stock for the firm
v = P2 + ε, where ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε). (2.3)
Note that the long-term price can change if the manager repurchases or issues stock;
we denote this price by P ′2
P ′2 = P2 +
F (P2 − P1)
N − F , (2.4)
where N is the initial number of outstanding shares, and P1 is the market price of the
stock at date 1. We assume that a firm’s decision to repurchase or issue equity and the
market-clearing price are fully observable by everyone in the market. Note, however,
that whether investors observe repurchases and equity issuances is not important in
our setting since the same information can be inferred from the market price. In this
way, our model differs from the one used by Oded (2005), who assumes that both
prices and repurchases are unobservable and that investors submit their bids for stock
through an auction in which a firm receives priority over other participants.
There are n current shareholders holding the firm’s shares and m outside investors
interested in buying the firm’s stock.10 All shareholders and potential investors are
know whether the firm is timing the market or acting for exogenous reasons. Appendix A provides
the fixed-point solution for parameters µu and σ
2
u.
10In our model, each shareholder can hold a different number of shares, so that the number of
current shareholders does not need to coincide with the number of outstanding shares.
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rational and can trade in the firm’s stock at any point in time. Shareholders and new
investors maximize their expected wealth given the available information, but also
have specific preferences for buying or selling shares, modeled through the following
objective function
EUi ≡ max
Xi
E(Wi|F )− θ
2
(Xi −Qi)2 , (2.5)
where Wi = (Ni +Xi)P
′
2 −XiP1. (2.6)
Here i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n + m} indexes different investors, with i ∈ {1, ..., n} referring to
current shareholders and i ∈ {n+ 1, ..., n+m} to new investors, Wi is the investor’s
wealth, Ni is the initial number of shares held by the investor, and Xi is the optimal
demand for shares at date 1. Specifically, at date 1 investor i buys Xi shares at
the price P1 and sells all his holdings Ni + Xi on the final date at the price P
′
2. The
quadratic term in the objective function (2.5) is introduced for modeling convenience.
It serves two purposes: to induce shareholders and new investors to trade and to
ensure that the demand for stock is finite in equilibrium. Qi is the investor’s preference
for buying shares (i.e., the number of shares the investor would buy absent any new
information), and the parameter θ captures the elasticity of the investor’s demand.
Our assumption of the utility function (2.5) is identical to specifying the investor’s
optimal demand as
X∗i = Qi +
E (P ′2|F )− P1
θ
≈ Qi + E (P2|F )− P1
θ
. (2.7)
The first term, Qi, is the investor’s status quo demand for stock, and the second
term is the additional demand triggered by the information contained in the firm’s
trade, similar to the one in the model by Grossman (1976). Because the investor’s
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profit decreases in price P1, the demand by individual investors is downward sloping
in equilibrium, and the market can clear.11
In line with actual experience and to ensure that the shareholder base changes
over time, we assume that the average parameter Qi is positive for new investors who
prefer to buy the firm’s stock (e.g., to complement and diversify their portfolios) and
negative for current shareholders who prefer to sell the stock (e.g., for liquidity or
diversification reasons). If this assumption were not true, trading would be possible
only between current shareholders. Section III.A provides empirical evidence sup-
porting the validity of this assumption. We normalize the average Qi of all individual
investors and shareholders to zero, so that the equilibrium market-clearing price when
the firm is not trading in its stock is P1 = P = E (P2).
12
Next, we specify the equilibrium and examine how the welfare of current share-
holders is affected by the firm’s market timing strategies.
2.3.2 Symmetric Market Timing: Implications for Current Shareholders
We first analyze the basic case in which the manager maximizes the expected profit
from trading F shares conditional on her signal. A priori this seems to be a natural
choice of the objective function since it leads to a symmetric market timing strategy:
repurchase stock when it is undervalued and issue stock when it is overvalued. It is
also consistent with the usual assumption in the literature that the manager cannot
11The downward-sloping demand functions can also be justified by differences in shareholder be-
liefs (Bagwell (1991) and Huang and Thakor (2013)), the investor trades being processed sequentially
through the limit order book (Biais et al. (1995)), or the firm’s stock having no close traded sub-
stitutes (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)). Empirical evidence in support of downward-sloping
demand functions is provided in Greenwood (2005) and Shleifer (1986).
12Note that if the average Qi were not zero or there were a non-zero demand by an uninformed
firm, F , the market would still clear, but at a different price P1.
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tender her own shares during a repurchase or participate in a seasoned equity offering
(e.g., Morellec and Schurhoff (2011) and Constantinides and Grundy (1989)) and
wants to maximize the value of a fixed equity stake. We allow the manager to be
strategic in her trades; i.e., she takes into account the effect of her trade on the stock
price,
max
F
E [(P2 − P1 (F ))F |v] . (2.8)
Positive values of F indicate stock buybacks and negative values capture stock is-
suances. The following proposition describes the linear equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose the manager maximizes the expected trading profit. There
exists a unique linear rational expectations equilibrium with the price and demand for
shares given by
P1 = P + βF, (2.9)
F ∗ =
σ2p
σ2p + σ
2
ε
v − P
2β
, (2.10)
X∗i = Qi −
F
n+m
, (2.11)
where β > 0 is a constant given in the Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. First, if the firm places a positive
order F for stock, the equilibrium price increases because investors infer that with
some probability the order is coming from an informed manager and thus signals
positive information. Second, the firm’s optimal demand for shares F ∗ is directly
proportional to stock mispricing and increases with the precision of the manager’s
signal. Therefore the optimal market timing strategy for a profit-maximizing manager
is symmetric, with the manager being equally likely to time share repurchases and
equity sales. Finally, it is somewhat counterintuitive that the individual demand for
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shares X∗i decreases with the firm’s order size F . This is because, for the market
to clear, a firm’s trade must be accommodated by uninformed shareholders and new
investors. Uninformed individuals are willing to take the other side of the firm’s trade
because the equilibrium price is such that they make up for their losses from trading
against timing firms with gains from trading with non-timing firms.
The next proposition compares the observable characteristics of stock repurchases
and equity sales for this equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Assume that the manager maximizes the expected trading profit. Then
the following claims hold.
(i) The frequency and volume of share repurchases are equal, respectively, to those of
share issuances
Pr (F ∗ > 0) = Pr (F ∗ < 0) , (2.12)
E [F |F ∗ > 0] Pr (F ∗ > 0) = E [−F |F ∗ < 0] Pr (F ∗ < 0) . (2.13)
(ii) The profit from share repurchase timing is equal to the profit from share issuance
timing
E [(P2 − P1)F |F ∗ > 0] = E [(P2 − P1)F |F ∗ < 0] . (2.14)
(iii) The price drift following share repurchases is equal, in absolute value, to the price
drift following equity issuances
|E [P2 − P1|F ∗ > 0]| = |E [P2 − P1|F ∗ < 0]| . (2.15)
We now analyze how the firm’s market timing affects its existing shareholders.
Note that we do not consider how timing by one firm affects shareholders of another
firm. This is because firm managers take the policies of other firms as given and
cannot influence them in any way.
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Recall that, when the firm times the market, i-th shareholder wealth is given by
(2.6). When the firm does not time the market, the shareholder buys Qi shares at
price P and can later sell these shares along with original Ni shares at price P2, so
that his wealth is (Ni +Qi)P2−QiP . Therefore the change in wealth of shareholder
i caused by the firm’s market timing is
∆Wi = (Ni +Xi)P
′
2 −XiP1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth with timing
− ((Ni +Qi)P2 −QiP)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth without timing
. (2.16)
We can rewrite this expression in the more intuitive form
∆Wi = (Xi −Qi) (P2 − P1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantity effect
+Qi
(
P − P1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+ (Ni +Xi) (P
′
2 − P2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
long-term gain
. (2.17)
It follows then that the effect on shareholders of trading by a firm in its own stock
can be described by three effects: a quantity effect, a price effect, and a long-term
gain effect. The first term in (2.17) captures the quantity effect, which occurs when
shareholders change their demand for stock as a result of the firm’s timing actions.
The number of shares traded by individuals can be affected because they infer infor-
mation from the firm’s decisions and also because the market needs to clear additional
trades by the firm. The second term in (2.17 ) is the price effect, which occurs when
the firm’s timing actions change the stock price and shareholders buy or sell stock at
this new price. Because current shareholders are net sellers (negative Qi on average),
the price effect is positive for stock repurchases and negative for stock issuances. The
third term is the long-term gain effect. It captures the fact that shareholders who
hold the stock until its true value is revealed benefit from the appreciation in the
long-term price.
It is the quantity and price effects that distinguish our approach from previous
studies. For example, it is well understood that successful market timing increases
the wealth of a shareholder with a fixed number of shares. However, this does not
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need to imply that a manager working in the interest of all ongoing shareholders
should time the market. The issue is that the number of ongoing shareholders is not
fixed; it is determined in a market-clearing equilibrium and depends on how many
shares the manager issues or repurchases. Each of the ongoing shareholders is better
off with equity market timing, but the number of these shareholders decreases with
repurchases and increases with issuances.
Intuitively, the wealth implications of market timing depend on the number of
current shareholders who remain with the firm and benefit from the long-term gains.
We first consider the case in which the aggregate number of shares that current
shareholders normally sell (and new investors buy), Q+ ≡
n+m∑
i=n+1
Qi, is small. For
brevity, we will refer to Q+ as the share turnover.
Proposition 5 Denote by W =
n∑
i=1
Wi the current shareholder value and assume that
the share turnover is not too large, i.e., Q+ < Q, where
Q =
N
2
m
n+m
. (2.18)
Then the following claims hold.
(i) Issuance of overvalued stock decreases shareholder value when overpricing is small.
Specifically, there exists a threshold v
v ≡ P − Q
+N
2γ
(
Q−Q+) . (2.19)
such that for P > v > v
E
(
W |v, v < P , F ∗ < 0) < E (W |v, v < P , F = 0) . (2.20)
(ii) Share repurchase of undervalued stock always increases shareholder value.
(iii) Given a fixed magnitude of mispricing |v − P |, current shareholders gain more
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when the manager times share repurchases than when she times equity sales
E
(
W |v, v > P , F ∗ > 0)− E (W |v, v > P , F = 0) > (2.21)
E
(
W |v, v < P , F ∗ < 0)− E (W |v, v < P , F = 0) .
(iv) In expectation, current shareholders benefit from market timing, i.e.,
E (W |F ∗) > E (W |F = 0) . (2.22)
This proposition is central to our study and discusses the implications of the
symmetric market timing strategy for shareholder value. The proof of the proposition
exploits the fact that dollar gains and losses for all shareholders and new investors
must sum to zero. The results can be summarized as follows. When the share
turnover is small, many current shareholders remain with the firm until the true
value is revealed, and therefore they capture the benefits of timing through the long-
term gain effect. However, current shareholders are affected differentially by share
repurchases and equity sales. Share repurchases of undervalued stock always make
them better off. But, new share sales of overvalued stock can make them worse off.
To understand the intuition behind the latter result, recall that current shareholders
are net sellers. When a firm issues equity, shareholders who are now competing with
the firm end up selling fewer overpriced shares. Additionally, they sell those shares
at a lower price. The expected losses of selling shareholders are partially offset by
the long-term gains of the ongoing shareholders. The proposition shows that current
shareholders as a group are worse off in the region of small overvaluation, where the
price and quantity effects dominate the long-term gain effect.
The last result in the proposition shows that, in comparison with a manager who
does nothing, current shareholders prefer a manager who always repurchases stock
whenever her information is positive and issues shares whenever her information is
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negative. Because repurchases increase price P1, and equity sales decrease it, and
because the market timing strategy is symmetric with respect to stock mispricing, it
must be that the price effect averages out for current shareholders. Given a low share
turnover, the current shareholders capture the benefits of market timing. As we show
later, this result reverses for large turnover.
In Appendix B, we discuss how the results of Proposition 5 change if we consider
how market timing affects the full objective function of current shareholders, U , in-
stead of shareholder value, W . Intuitively, because by trading on the firm’s behalf
the manager conveys new information to the market, shareholders adjust their de-
mand for the firm’s stock and deviate from their preferred trades, Qi. Therefore, they
experience additional disutility from market timing.
We next discuss the case in which the share turnover is large.
Proposition 6 If the share turnover is large, i.e., Q+ > Q, then:
(i) Issuance of overvalued stock always decreases shareholder value
E
(
W |v, v < P , F ∗ < 0) < E (W |v, v < P , F = 0) . (2.23)
(ii) A share repurchase of undervalued stock decreases shareholder value when under-
pricing is large; i.e., there exists a threshold v
v ≡ P + Q
+N
2γ
(
Q+ −Q) , (2.24)
such that for v > v > P
E
(
W |v, v > P , F ∗ > 0) < E (W |v, v > P , F = 0) . (2.25)
(iii) If Q+ > 2Q, then, in expectation, current shareholders are worse off with market
timing, i.e.,
E (W |v, F ∗) < E (W |v, F = 0) . (2.26)
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The proposition posits that, when the share turnover is high, current shareholders
can become worse off when the manager times the equity market. Specifically, share-
holder wealth always decreases with the issuance of overvalued stock and can decrease
with the repurchase of undervalued stock if mispricing is large. Overall, sharehold-
ers in a high-turnover firm prefer a manager who does nothing to the manager who
systematically uses private information when issuing and repurchasing stock.
Intuitively, this result obtains because the high share turnover strips current share-
holders of most long-term gains associated with market timing. When many new in-
vestors purchase the firm’s shares, they are the ones who benefit from the long-term
price appreciation. When the long-term gain is small, shareholder wealth is primar-
ily affected through the quantity and/or price effects. The price effect is symmetric
with respect to repurchases and share issuances and is therefore zero in expectation.
In contrast, the quantity effect makes shareholders worse off because they sell more
shares during underpricing and fewer shares during overpricing.
2.3.3 Optimal Market Timing Strategy for Current Shareholders
Thus far we have focused on the effects of a symmetric market timing strategy on
a firm’s current shareholders. We now derive the optimal market timing strategy by
a manager maximizing the current shareholder value. (Appendix B shows that the
results are qualitatively similar if the manager maximizes the current shareholders’
full objective function).13 Relying on the results in the previous section–that market
13If the manager maximizes the full current shareholders’ objective function, the optimal market
timing strategy is less sensitive to the manager’s information because, intuitively, the manager would
like to minimize the shareholders’ disutility associated with deviations of their trades from initial
preferences.
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timing decreases shareholder value when the share turnover is large–we only consider
the case when the turnover is moderate, Q+ < Q.
Recall that under a symmetric timing strategy (i.e., the strategy that maximizes
the trading profit of the informed firm and calls for a repurchase when the stock is
undervalued and share issuance when it is overvalued), current shareholders can be
made worse off. Specifically, we established in Proposition 5 that a share issuance
by the firm when its stock is overpriced sometimes hurts its current shareholders.
We therefore anticipate that a manager creating value for current shareholders would
favor market timing with share repurchases rather than with equity sales. The next
proposition establishes this result formally.
Proposition 7 Suppose the manager wants to maximize current shareholder value,
W , and the share turnover is not large, Q+ < Q.
Then, for any mispricing, v − P , the equilibrium price, the firm’s demand, and indi-
viduals’ demand for stock are
P1 = P − α + βF. (2.27)
F ∗ = F +
σ2p
σ2p + σ
2
ε
v − P
2β
, (2.28)
X∗i = Qi −
F
n+m
, (2.29)
where constants F > 0, α > 0, and β > 0 are given in the Appendix.
The important result established by the proposition above is that a manager who
wants to maximize current shareholder value repurchases more (and issues less) stock
than the one who wants to maximize the trading profit by following a symmetric
strategy. In particular, the optimal timing strategy calls for repurchasing a positive
number of shares, F , and then amending the demand in a way that is proportional
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to mispricing. Note also that the equilibrium price P1 is adjusted downward because
investors realize that the manager over-repurchases. In particular, when the manager
neither repurchases nor issues equity (F = 0), the price is below average. Note, how-
ever, that because the optimal demand for stock by the firm increases with mispricing,
a larger repurchase still conveys better news.
Having derived the optimal market timing strategy for a manager who wants to
create value for the firm’s existing shareholders, we can now examine the frequency
and volume of stock repurchases and equity sales, the profit from stock repurchases
and equity sales, and post-event stock returns.
Proposition 8 Assume that the manager wants to maximize current shareholder
value. Then the following claims hold.
(i) The frequency and volume of share repurchases are larger, respectively, than those
of equity issuances
Pr (F ∗ > 0) > Pr (F ∗ < 0) , (2.30)
E [F |F ∗ > 0] Pr (F ∗ > 0) > E [−F |F ∗ < 0] Pr (F ∗ < 0) . (2.31)
(ii) The profit from share repurchases is smaller than that from equity issuances
E [(P2 − P1)F |F ∗ > 0] < E [(P2 − P1)F |F ∗ < 0] . (2.32)
(iii) The price drift following repurchases is smaller, in absolute value, than that
following equity issuances
|E [P2 − P1|F ∗ > 0]| < |E [P2 − P1|F ∗ < 0]| . (2.33)
As established in the previous proposition, managers acting in the interest of
current shareholders conduct repurchases even if they do not believe that the stock
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is significantly undervalued. In contrast, they issue equity highly selectively. From
this observation it follows that the profit conditional on share repurchase is smaller
than the profit conditional on equity issuance. The proposition further states that
the average post-event stock returns must be higher following an equity sale than
following a share repurchase. This is because the magnitude of stock mispricing
needed to trigger an equity sale is much larger than the one required for a stock
repurchase.
These results are important in light of some stylized empirical facts, such as a
relatively low frequency of SEOs, a high frequency of stock buybacks, and the evidence
that some repurchases are conducted at prices seemingly above fundamental values.
For example, managers announcing new stock repurchase programs often claim that
their goal is to enhance shareholder value, yet it is not unusual to observe low stock
returns after a repurchase. In particular, Bonaime et al. (2014) find that managers
repurchase when stock prices are high and valuation ratios (book-to-market and sales-
to-price) are unfavorable; they conclude that managers do not appear to successfully
time the market with share repurchases.
Our theory provides a simple new explanation for this circumstance. The ex-
tant literature focuses on other reasons for doing buybacks, which are outside the
scope of our model, such as distributing unneeded cash and managing earnings per
share. Equivalently, the lack of a large volume of SEOs is usually explained by large
underwriting fees and other fixed costs.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we use data to validate our assumption that current shareholders
are net sellers of a firm’s stock and then test the main predictions of the model by
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analyzing the volume and frequency of repurchases and equity issuances, post-event
stock returns, and the profit from market timing.
2.4.1 Are Current Shareholders Net Sellers?
Our model relies on the important assumption that current shareholders are net
sellers. Although this assumption is natural, two situations, issuance of new shares
and short selling, merit discussion. First, the additional issuance of shares by the
firm may result in current shareholders increasing their holdings. Note that this is
consistent with our model since we only require shareholders to be net sellers in an
inactive firm. Second, shares can be sold short by new investors, particularly by in-
stitutions that have different information or beliefs. This may temporarily increase
the holdings of stock by current shareholders. However, one does not expect institu-
tions to short-sell stock most of the time, and even when they do so on occasion, it
is unlikely that all new investors as a group (including new retail investors) will sell
the firm’s stock. It is therefore likely that current shareholders remain net sellers in
these situations as well.
To evaluate whether data support our assumption of net selling by current share-
holders and to assess the magnitude of such selling, we empirically examine trades by
one group of current shareholders–institutions. We focus on this group of sharehold-
ers because data on their positions are readily available, unlike, e.g., data on retail
investors. The data are obtained from the institutional holdings database (Thomson
Reuters) for the period January 1980 to January 2014. Each quarter t we consider
all institutions with non-zero holdings of a firm’s stock and define them as current
shareholders. We then calculate the changes in the number of shares held by these
institutions from this quarter to the next and sum across all institutions that had
stock at date t. If the resulting number is negative, it means the current (institu-
78
tional) shareholders sell the security as a group during this quarter and we classify
them as net sellers.
As an alternative, we repeat the same procedure at the annual frequency and also
for the changes in normalized holdings–i.e., the number of shares held by institutions
normalized by the number of shares outstanding. The results are reported in Table
2.1. Most of the time (78.1% of all quarters and 81.3% of all years), the current
institutional shareholders are net sellers. The percentage of net sellers is even higher
if we focus on the changes in the normalized holdings rather than a raw number
of shares (81.5% of all quarters and 87.7% of all years). On average, institutions
sell 3.8% of outstanding shares each quarter and 9.0% each year, and these numbers
are statistically different from zero. Thus our empirical results strongly support our
assumption that current shareholders are net sellers. One caveat, of course, is that
we capture trading by only one group of current shareholders, and there are likely to
be systematic differences between institutions, venture capitalist/founders, and retail
investors. Nevertheless, institutions hold, on average, a considerable fraction of the
firm’s stock (approximately 27%). Additionally, other groups of current shareholders,
such as private equity, venture capitalists, and firm employees, may have a greater
need for diversification and therefore a greater tendency to sell the stock.
2.4.2 Data and Main Variables
Next, we analyze volume, frequency, post-event stock returns, and the profit from
market timing to see whether they can be rationalized based on managers’ preference
for current shareholders. We use standard measures of volume and post-event abnor-
mal stock returns. However, in our search of the academic literature, we could not
find any measures of profit from market timing. Therefore we motivate and develop
a new measure that empirically assesses the success of market timing strategies.
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Our sample includes the universe of Compustat firms with non-missing balance
sheet data for the period 1982-2010. We start in 1982 because the safe harbor pro-
visions under the Securities and Exchange Act were adopted at this time and firms
could repurchase stock without facing any legal uncertainty. Following Stephens and
Weisbach (1998), we proxy for share repurchases with the monthly decreases in split-
adjusted shares outstanding reported by the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). This method assumes that the firm has not repurchased any shares if the
number of shares increased or remained the same during the month. We take the
last day of the month as the repurchase date and calculate the stock return over a
period of either one or three years from that date. The fraction of shares repurchased
in each month is the number of shares repurchased during the month divided by the
number of shares outstanding at the end of the previous month.
A potential problem with this measure is that it tends to underestimate the
amount of true share repurchases (see, e.g., Jagannathan et al. (2000)). For ex-
ample, if a company buys back stock and issues equity during the same month, we
can record a zero repurchase. This is particularly important for small firms since
they tend to issue more equity though broad-based equity compensation programs
(Bergman and Jenter (2007)) and also do more SEOs. We therefore also employ a
commonly used alternative approach to calculate the actual repurchases by using the
Compustat quarterly data on the total dollar value spent on repurchases. These data
can contain information unrelated to repurchases of common stock (see, e.g., Kahle
(2002)). Nevertheless, the advantage of Compustat repurchase data is that they are
not systematically understated and provide the least biased estimate of true repur-
chases (Banyi et al. (2008)). Using Compustat data to calculate the number of shares
repurchased each quarter, we divide the total dollar amount spent on repurchases
during a quarter by the average monthly stock price.
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The sample of SEOs is from the Securities Data Company (SDC) new issues
database. We look only at primary issues of common stock. Although the SDC
database provides the exact stock issuance date, we use the last day of the calendar
month as the issuance date in calculating the one-year and three-year stock returns
after an SEO. This procedure ensures that post-SEO stock returns are directly com-
parable to post-repurchase returns.
We also compute the new equity issuances using the changes in the number of
shares outstanding. Similar to the calculation of our repurchase measure, we track the
increases in the total number of shares each month. The advantage of this measure is
that it captures, in addition to SEOs, other ways in which firms sell shares. According
to Fama and French (2005), the issuance of stock through SEOs constitutes only a
small fraction of the total issuance activity, and is smaller in magnitude than the
issuance of stock due to mergers financing. For example, Fama and French (2005)
report that approximately 86% percent of all firms issued some form of equity over
the period 1993 to 2002. This number contrasts sharply with the low frequency of
SEOs over the same period. It may be argued that M&A activity financed by stock
is one of the ways in which firms time the equity market. For example, Shleifer and
Vishny (2003) present a model showing how rational managers can use stock as a
means of payment in mergers and acquisitions to take advantage of stock mispricing,
and Loughran and Vijh (1997) find evidence of negative long-run abnormal returns
for bidders making stock acquisitions.
However, a disadvantage of this measure is that it includes the issuance of shares
that is not triggered by the firm, but occurs because firm investors chose a particular
action and thereby cause the equity issuance. For example, convertible debt holders
can choose to convert their debt into equity. Similarly, firm employees can buy the
company stock through employee stock purchase plans or exercise their stock options,
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which leads to an increase in the number of outstanding shares. There are two reasons
why such items should not be included in the total share issuance. First, since
investor-initiated issuance is not directly triggered by the firm manager, we cannot
infer whether the manager intended to time the market. Second, the benefits from
market timing of employee stock option exercises and other similar investor actions
do not accrue to firm shareholders, but benefit employees, bondholders, or other
parties. Therefore, the wealth transfers induced by market timing would be different
than those we discussed in the context of the model. To mitigate these concerns, we
follow McKeon (2013) and exclude equity issuance with monthly proceeds below 1%
of market value of equity.14
Our measures of profit from market timing aim to capture the additional abnormal
return earned by a shareholder with a fixed number of shares because of equity market
timing. For each month, we calculate the proportion of equity repurchased during
a month, αi, and then multiply it by either one- or three-year post-repurchase risk-
adjusted returns, ri. We then sum the resulting measures over the 12 months of the
year to obtain the total,
Repurchase timing =
12∑
i=1
αiri. (2.34)
For example, if a manager buys back 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares in May,
and shares appreciate by 10% from June to May of the following year, the measure
of repurchase timing will be equal to 0.5%. Prior to calculating the market timing
measures, we adjust the raw stock returns for risk using the Fama and French 100
portfolios formed on size and book-to-market deciles. Each month, we match firms
in our sample to the comparable size and book-to-market portfolios based on the
14McKeon (2013) works with quarterly data and classifies issuances that are greater than 3% of
the market value of equity as firm-initiated. Since we use monthly data, we chose a 1% cutoff.
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break points available on Kenneth French’s web site and calculate the difference in
buy-and-hold returns for our firms and these portfolios.15 Using a risk-adjustment
measure is justified by our theoretical model, in which mispricing is based on firm-
specific information and therefore is cross-sectional by design. Note, however, that
the risk adjustment necessarily removes the aggregate component, or “whole-market”
mispricing, from our timing measure. Therefore, such measures cannot be used to
identify whether executives can predict the long-term market trends.
Sales timing is defined in a similar manner to repurchase timing, with the differ-
ence that we track the proportion of equity sold each month, si,
Sales timing = −
12∑
i=1
siri. (2.35)
Note that timing measures can be positive or negative, with larger positive values
indicating more successful timing by the firm. We also calculate repurchase and
sales timing measures using quarterly data. Appendix provides further detail on the
construction of timing measures and their link to theory.
2.4.3 Empirical Results for Profit from Market Timing
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for the total profit from
market timing, calculated as the additional return earned by shareholders when the
company sells or repurchases a fraction of its stock.
It appears from the table that, on average, firms time the market well. For
example, the average additional return from timing equity sales and repurchases is
positive 0.24% over a one-year period (t-stat = 13.79) and the corresponding number
for a three-year period is 0.65% (t-stat = 18.62). Since many firm-years do not have
15This method is preferred over risk adjustment using the market model since using cumulative
abnormal returns over a long period may yield positively biased test statistics (Barber and Lyon
(1997)).
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a single repurchase, SEO, or equity sale, we also present the summary statistics only
for those observations that have a timing event (Panel B of Table 2.2). Naturally,
when we condition on these events, the profit from market timing becomes larger. We
find that timing with repurchases and sales provides an additional return of 0.40%
over a one-year period, which means that an average firm trading 10% of its equity
earns 4% in abnormal returns for the following year.
We next analyze whether profit from market timing comes primarily through share
repurchases or issuances. As is evident from Table 2.3 and 2.4, the profit from stock
repurchases appears to be considerably smaller than the profit from SEOs and other
equity sales. For example, the average profit from repurchase timing is only 0.04%
per year (t-stat = 4.78) when we use the CRSP-based measure, and 0.05% (t-stat
= 6.11) when we use the Compustat-based measure, whereas the average profit is
0.36% (t-stat = 2.38) for SEO timing. Since SEOs represent only a small proportion
of newly issued equity, we also repeat the estimation using the measure based on
general equity sales (increases in the number of outstanding shares). This measure
produces similar results, with robust evidence of successful market timing of equity
sales with one- and three-year horizons. Specifically, the profit from timing equity
sales is 0.62% per year and is statistically different from zero (t-stat = 12.84). The
difference between profit from repurchase and profit from issuance timing appears
even more striking if we compare the medians instead of the means.
In Table 2.4, we present the formal tests for the difference in means (t-test) and
medians (non-parametric Wilcoxon sum rank test) between the profit from repurchase
timing and issuance timing. We observe that both the average and median profits
from issuance timing are significantly different from those from repurchase timing.
This result does not depend on whether we measure issuance using the seasoned
equity offerings from SDC or equity sales based on the increases in shares outstanding.
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Overall, we find that issuance timing is more profitable than repurchase timing. In
conjunction with our theory, this implies that managers act as if they were maximizing
value for current shareholders:–they repurchase too often and issue equity selectively.
2.4.4 Empirical Results for Post-Event Returns and Volume
We next present the summary statistics for the post-event abnormal stock returns
(Table 2.5). Firms in our sample experience 1.51% in abnormal returns the year after
the repurchase and 3.36% three years after the event.16 SEOs tend to be followed by
a larger magnitude of abnormal stock returns, earning -2.11% the following year or
-12.57% over three years. Following equity sales, the risk-adjusted returns are also
negative, on average, at -1.71% in the year following the event.
Recall from Proposition 8 that if managers maximize current shareholder value,
we would expect to see smaller post-event returns (in absolute magnitude) following
repurchases than following issuances. In general, we find that to be the case, but
the difference does not appear to be statistically significant, with exception of the
difference in average returns after SEOs and repurchases over a one-year period (Table
2.6). However, we do find that in all cases the difference in median abnormal returns
following an event is both statistically and economically significant. Overall, our
results are broadly consistent with current shareholder value maximization.
A potential alternative explanation for these return dynamics comes from the
investment literature. Specifically, it is known that sales of equity often precede
new capital investment and can be used to finance the exercise of real options (see,
e.g., DeAngelo et al. (2010)). In turn, the exercise of real options may decrease the
16The abnormal returns after the repurchases in our sample are not directly comparable to those
in previous studies (e.g., Ikenberry et al. (1995) because we look at actual repurchases rather than
at announcements of intent to buy back the stock).
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systematic risk of the firm and result in lower expected returns. This could be because
options are exercised in anticipation of the low cost of capital (Cochrane (1991)) or
because the exercise transforms riskier options into less risky assets in place (Carlson
et al. (2006)). Therefore, if we fail to adjust properly for the change in expected
returns, we may mistakenly attribute the evidence of post-issuance abnormal returns
to mispricing. Although the risk-adjustment technique that we employ does not
match firms on investment rates, we anticipate that the bias associated with risk
adjustment due to the exercise of real options is small. First, the connection between
investment and returns may be pronounced for equity issuance, but it is more difficult
to build a similar risk-based explanation for stock repurchases. Second, as Lyandres
et al. (2008) explain, new investment is often financed by methods other than SEOs,
such as initial public offerings (IPOs), straight debt, and convertible debt.
To see whether our results for equity sales and SEOs are driven by different real
investment dynamics in these firms, we sort all firms in our sample by their investment
rates, defined as capital expenditures in the year of the SEO divided by the beginning-
of-year book assets. Table 2.7 and 2.8 shows our results. The pattern that timing
with general equity sales results in a higher profit than timing with share repurchases
is evident across all groups of investment rates, and the difference does not vary
consistently with investment rates. Similarly, profit from SEO timing is larger than
the profit from repurchase timing in the lowest and highest investment samples. For
stock returns, investment also does not appear to be a major explanation. This
suggests that our results are unlikely to be driven solely by expected return dynamics
due to investment.
Next, we show the statistics for volume and frequency of stock repurchases and
issuances (see Table 2.9). Perhaps unsurprisingly, few firms conduct an SEO in a
given year; the average frequency of these events is 4.03%. Consistent with Fama and
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French (2005), general equity sales are much more common, with the average firm
having a 35.80% propensity to sell equity during a year. Stock repurchases, however,
occur more frequently than both SEOs and general equity sales, with the probability
of a buyback at 36.86% per year. Likewise, the average annual inflation-adjusted
volume of repurchases is larger than that of SEOs ($26.94 million vs. $5.95 million).
However, the volume of general equity sales is also large at $42.23 on average. In sum,
the evidence on volume of issuances and repurchases is mixed, whereas the frequency
of events of the two types is consistent with managers acting in the interest of current
shareholders.
2.5 Conclusion
We examine the conflicts of interest between shareholders and new investors in a
firm’s market timing decisions. By recognizing that a firm’s shareholders are affected
by stock mispricing even in the absence of share repurchases and equity sales by the
firm, we disentangle the effects of exogenous mispricing and firm actions on existing
shareholders. Using this insight, we show theoretically that a market timing strategy
that exploits under- and over-pricing of a firm’s stock can reduce the wealth of the
current shareholders. Additionally, current shareholders are relatively better off with
share repurchase timing than with share issuance timing.
According to the theory developed in this paper, if managers act in the inter-
est of existing shareholders, share repurchases should be more frequent than equity
sales, repurchases should be followed by a lower magnitude of abnormal returns, and
shareholders will earn a smaller profit from repurchase timing than from issuance
timing. Our empirical findings provide support for these predictions, which suggests
that most managers in the United States appear to be looking out for their firms’
current shareholders.
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A.1 DERIVATION OF FOC FOR THE TWO-PERIOD MODEL
First I want to denote the intial stock of durables as D′0 = (1− δ)D0 for short and
use it throughout the whole appendix for convenience.
The optimization problem (1.1) can be rewritten as follows:
V0(W0, D0) = max
Dp
∫ p(Dp−D′0)
W0
R=−∞
u(D′0) dF (R) +
∫ +∞
R=
p(Dp−D′0)
W0
u(Dp) dF (R)
= max
Dp
u(D′0)
∫ p(Dp−D′0)
W0
R=−∞
dF (R) + u(Dp)
∫ +∞
R=
p(Dp−D′0)
W0
dF (R)
= max
Dp
u(D′0)F
(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
)
+ u(Dp)
(
1− F
(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
))
.
(A.1)
Taking the first order derivative of (A.1) with respect to Dp, the FOC is obtained as
follow:
u′(D∗p)(1− F (
p(D∗p −D′0)
W0
))− p
W0
f(
p(D∗p −D′0)
W0
)(u(D∗p)− u(D′0)) = 0, (A.2)
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of R˜, and f(·) is the probability
density function of R˜.
A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 — CONSERVATIVE PLANNING
Proof The FOD (First order derivative) of the optimization problem (1.1) is
FOD = u′(Dp)(1− F (p(Dp −D
′
0)
W0
))− p
W0
f(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
)(u(Dp)− u(D′0)). (A.3)
Note that FOD > 0 when Dp ≤ D′0. It directly follows from (A.3) because
u′(·) > 0.
Next, I show that FOD < 0 when
p(Dp−D′0)
W0
≥ 1 + µ.
Since u′′(·) ≤ 0,
u(Dp)− u(D′0) =
∫ Dp
c=D′0
u′(c)dc ≥
∫ Dp
c=D0
u′(Dp)dc = u′(Dp)(Dp −D0). (A.4)
FOD ≤ u′(Dp)(1− F (p(Dp −D
′
0)
W0
))− p
W0
f(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
)u′(Dp)(Dp −D0)
= u′(Dp)((1− F (p(Dp −D
′
0)
W0
))− p(Dp −D
′
0)
W0
f(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
)).
(A.5)
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Therefore, given 1 − F (x) < xf(x) ∀x ≥ 1 + µ and u′(·) > 0, FOD < 0 when
p(Dp−D′0)
(
W0) ≥ 1 + µ.
By now, we know that FOD > 0 when Dp ≤ D′0 and FOD < 0 when p(Dp−D
′
0)
W0
≥
1+µ. By the continuity of FOD observed in A.3, there must existD∗p ∈ (D′0, (1+µ)W0−D
′
0
p
).
A.3 PPROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 — CONSERVATIVE PLANNING IN THE
CASE OF UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
First, I show that for a uniform distribution on U [a, b], a > 0 is sufficient for
1− F (x) < xf(x) ∀x ≥ 1 + µ.
Proof For the uniform distribution, 1− F (x) = 1− x−a
b−a =
b−x
b−a and xf(x) =
x
b−a . If
a > 0 and x ≥ 1 + µ, where 1 + µ = a+b
2
1− F (x) = b− x
b− a <
b− a+b
2
b− a =
1
2
<
a+ b
2
1
b− a < xf(x). (A.6)
Secondly, I prove a stronger version of Proposition 1: Suppose the (gross) invest-
ment return follows a uniform distribution U [a, b] and the consumer has a continuous
utility function u(·) satisfies u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0, then ∃!D∗p ∈ (D′0, (1+µ)W0−D
′
0
p
),
i.e. p(D∗p −D′0) < (1 + µ)W0, if a > 0.
Proof From the above proof, we know that the optimal D∗p ∈ (D′0, (1+µ)W0−D
′
0
p
), so I
only need to show the uniqueness of the solution. Note that the SOD (second-order
derivative) is
SOD = u′′(Dp)(1− F (p(Dp −D
′
0)
W0
))− 2p
W0
u′(Dp)f(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
)
− p
W0
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
f ′(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
).
(A.7)
For a uniform distribution, f ′(·) = 0. Therefore, the SOD is negative when
Dp ∈ (D′0, (1+µ)W0−D
′
0
p
). Uniqueness of the optimal D∗p follows.
A.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 — CONSERVATIVE PLANNING IN THE
CASE OF NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
First, I show that for a normal distribution N (1+µ, σ2), 1+µ >√pi
2
σ is sufficient
for 1− F (x) < xf(x) ∀x ≥ 1 + µ.
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Proof For a normal distribution N (1 + µ, σ2), 1− F (x) < 1
2
∀x ≥ 1 + µ and f(x) <
1√
2piσ
∀x. Given that 1 + µ >√pi
2
σ, ∀x ≥ 1 + µ,
xf(x) ≥ (1 + µ) 1√
2piσ
>
√
pi
2
σ
1√
2piσ
= 1/2 > F (x). (A.8)
Next, I prove the stronger version of Proposition 1: Suppose the (gross) investment
return follows a normal distribution N (1 +µ, σ2) and the consumer has a continuous
utility function u(·) satisfies u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0, then ∃!D∗p ∈ (D′0, (1+µ)W0−D
′
0
p
),
i.e. p(D∗p −D′0) < (1 + µ)W0, if 1 + µ >
√
pi
2
σ.
Proof f ′(p(Dp−D
′
0)
W0
) > 0 when Dp ∈ (D′0, (1+µ)W0−D
′
0
p
), given the normal-distributed
investment return. Thus the SOD as derived in (A.7) is negative. Uniqueness of the
optimal D∗p on (D
′
0,
(1+µ)W0−D′0
p
) follows.
A.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 — UTILITY LOSS
Proof Suppose, consumer A is holding a risk-free asset with a fixed return Rf and
consumer B is holding a risky portfolio with a return R˜ with a expectation E(R˜) = Rf .
Note that the consumer A’s time-1 consumption DA1 = D
′
0 +
W0Rf
p
before he can
plan for the consumption perfectly.
Consumer B’s time-1 consumption depends on his investment realization and its
expectation can be written as:
E(DB1 ) =
∫ p(Dp−D′0)
W0
R=−∞
D′0 dF (R) +
∫ +∞
R=
p(Dp−D′0)
W0
Dp dF (R)
<
∫ p(Dp−D′0)
W0
R=−∞
(
D′0 +
W0R
p
)
dF (R) +
∫ +∞
R=
p(Dp−D′0)
W0
(
D′0 +
W0R
p
)
dF (R)
= D′0 +
W0E(R˜)
p
= D′0 +
W0Rf
p
= DA1
(A.9)
Therefore, the expected consumption of consumer B is lower than the consumption
of consumer A, which means consumer B has a lower expected utility when u′′(·) = 0.
By Jensen’s inequality, the same statement holds when the utility function is concave
(u′′(·) < 0), i.e.
E(u(DB1 )) < u(E(D
B
1 ))) < u(D
A
1 ). (A.10)
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A.6 HOMOGENEITY OF THE TWO-PERIOD OPTIMIZATION
Lemma 1 When power utility is applied, the value function V0(W0, D0) in (1.1) is
homogenous of degree 1− γ and the maximizer D∗p(W0, D0) is homogenous of degree
1.
Proof Substituting power utility u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ into the last line of (A.1),
V0(W0, D0) = max
Dp
(D′0)
1−γ
1− γ F
(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
)
+
D1−γp
1− γ
(
1− F
(
p(Dp −D′0)
W0
))
,
(A.11)
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of R˜.
Multiply both W0 and D0 by t, I obtain:
V0(tW0, tD0) = max
Dp
(tD′0)
1−γ
1− γ F
(
p(Dp − tD′0)
tW0
)
+
D1−γp
1− γ
(
1− F
(
p(Dp − tD′0)
tW0
))
= max
Dp
t1−γ
(D′0)1−γ
1− γ F
(
p(Dp
t
−D′0)
W0
)
+
(
Dp
t
)1−γ
1− γ
(
1− F
(
p(Dp
t
−D′0)
W0
))
= t1−γV0(W0, D0),
(A.12)
and D∗p(tW0, tD0)/t = D
∗
p(W0, D0), i.e. D
∗
p(tW0, tD0) = tD
∗
p(W0, D0).
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B.1 PROPOSITION PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1.
Applying the projection theorem for a normal distribution, we obtain the conditional
mean of P2 given a managerial signal
E(P2|v) = P +
σ2p
σ2p + σ
2
ε
(
v − P) . (B.1)
We conjecture that the equilibrium price is as follows
P1 = P + βF, (B.2)
and solve for parameter β in the equilibrium. Substituting the conjecture for P1 into
the manager’s problem (2.8), and taking the first-order condition with respect to F ,
yields
F ∗ =
E(P2|v)− P
2β
= γ
(
v − P) , (B.3)
where
γ =
σ2p
σ2p + σ
2
ε
1
2β
. (B.4)
The second-order condition is satisfied whenever λ (proportion of firms that repur-
chase or sell stock for information reasons) is less than 1
2
. Whenever λ > 1/2, the
linear equilibrium does not exist. For individuals who observe firm’s trade F , the
conditional mean of P2 is
E(P2|F ) = λE(P2|F, info) + (1− λ)E(P2|F, no info) = P + 2λβF. (B.5)
The equilibrium price is set by the market clearing condition. Using
n+m∑
i=1
Qi = 0 and
the individual demand functions (2.7), we can write this condition as
F +
n+m∑
i=1
X∗i = F + (n+m)
E (P2|F )− P1
θ
= 0. (B.6)
It follows that the individual investors share the extra demand from the firm equally,
i.e.,
X∗i = Qi −
F
n+m
. (B.7)
Substituting (B.5) into condition (B.6), we obtain the market clearing price
P1 = P +
(
θ
n+m
+ 2λβ
)
F. (B.8)
Comparing this expression to conjecture (B.2), we can solve for parameter β
β =
θ
(n+m) (1− 2λ) . (B.9)
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Finally, we solve for parameters µu and σ
2
u, such that the distribution of demand by
informed managers is identical to that by managers who repurchase or issue equity for
exogenous reasons. Specifically, the mean and variance of the demand by uninformed
managers solve a fixed-point problem
V ar(F ∗|µu, σ2u) = σ2u, (B.10)
E(F ∗|µu, σ2u) = µu.
Using (B.3), we obtain
µu = 0, (B.11)
σ2u =
(n+m)2 (1− 2λ)2 σ4p
4θ2
(
σ2p + σ
2
ε
) . (B.12)
Therefore, given any observed value F , the individuals will attribute probability λ
that the firm is informed and probability 1− λ that it is uninformed.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) The probability of a stock repurchase minus the probability of an equity sale is
Pr (F ∗ > 0)− Pr (F ∗ < 0) =
∫ ∞
0
f (x) dx−
∫ 0
−∞
f (x) dx = 0. (B.13)
where x = v−P and f (x) is the normal distribution density function with zero mean
and variance σ2 ≡ σ2p + σ2ε . Similarly, we can calculate the difference in total volume
Volume(Rep)− Volume(Iss) = E [F |F ∗ > 0] Pr (F ∗ > 0)− E [−F |F ∗ < 0] Pr (F ∗ < 0)
=
∫ ∞
0
γxf (x) dx−
(
−
∫ 0
−∞
γxf (x) dx
)
= 0. (B.14)
(ii) Using (B.1)-(B.3), we can write the manager’s trading profit conditional on signal
as
Π (x) = βγ2x2. (B.15)
Profit from repurchases minus profit from equity sales is then∫∞
0
Π (x) f (x) dx∫∞
0
f (x) dx
−
∫ 0
−∞Π (x) f (x) dx∫ 0
−∞ f (x) dx
= 2βγ2
(∫ ∞
0
x2f (x) dx−
∫ 0
−∞
x2f (x) dx
)
.
(B.16)
Because of the symmetry of the normal distribution, the expression above is equal to
0.
(iii) The expected post-event price drift given managerial signal can be written as
R (x) = E (P2|v)− P1 = βγx. (B.17)
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The absolute value of the expected price drift after a repurchase minus that after an
equity issuance is∣∣∣∣
∫∞
0
R (x) f (x) dx∫∞
0
f (x) dx
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 0
−∞R (x) f (x) dx∫ 0
−∞ f (x) dx
∣∣∣∣∣ = 2βγ(
∫ ∞
0
xf (x) dx+
∫ 0
−∞
xf (x) dx) = 0.
(B.18)
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) Note that any repurchase or equity issuance represents a zero-sum game between
the firm’s current shareholders and new investors. Thus it suffices to prove that
new investors can profit from equity issuance timing. From (2.6), the wealth of new
investor i who holds no shares initially is
Wi ≡ Xi (P ′2 − P1) . (B.19)
Recall that the manager issues shares (F < 0) during the overpricing (v < P ). Given
a particular signal of the manager v, the change in expected wealth of all new investors
after stock issuance by the firm is
n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
W F<0i −W F=0i |v
]
=
n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
Xi (P
′
2 − P1)−Qi
(
P2 − P
) |v] . (B.20)
To prove that current shareholders are worse off, we need to show that the sum above
is positive. Using the expression for the long-term price (2.4), we obtain
n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
W F<0i −W F=0i |v
]
=
n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
Xi
(
P2 +
F (P2 − P1)
N − F − P1
)
−Qi
(
P2 − P
) |v] .
(B.21)
Substituting the equilibrium price P1, individual demand functions Xi, and condi-
tional expectation E [P2|v], and using notation for mispricing x = v − P < 0, we can
rewrite
n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
W F<0i −W F=0i |x
]
=
βγx
N − γx
[
2γx
(
Q+ −Q)−Q+N] , (B.22)
where Q+ is the aggregate demand of new investors and Q is given by (2.18). The
expression (B.22) is positive (current shareholders are worse off) when
2γx
(
Q+ −Q) < Q+N. (B.23)
Since x < 0 and Q+ < Q, the condition above is satisfied when mispricing is not
too large. Therefore, we establish that current shareholders are worse off with equity
issuance timing by an informed manager (and the new investors are better off) when
v < v < P, (B.24)
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where
v ≡ P + Q
+N
2γ
(
Q+ −Q) . (B.25)
(ii) For the case of share repurchases of undervalued equity, the expression for change
in wealth of new investors is given by (B.22) with x > 0. Since Q+ < Q, it is negative.
Therefore, according to the zero-sum argument the current shareholder value always
increases.
(iii) To establish that current shareholders prefer share repurchases to equity issues,
we write the difference between new investors’ wealth with repurchase timing and
issuance timing, for a given magnitude of mispricing, |x| = ∣∣v − P ∣∣, and show that it
is negative. Specifically,
n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
W F>0i −W F=0i |v, v > P
]− n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
W F<0i −W F=0i |v, v < P
]
=(B.26)
=
βγ|x|
N − γ|x|
[
2γ|x| (Q+ −Q)−Q+N]− βγ|x|
N + γ|x|
[
2γ|x| (Q+ −Q)+Q+N] .
The expression above is negative when
2γ2x2
(
Q+ −Q) < Q+N2. (B.27)
The last condition is true because Q+ < Q.
(iv) To see that market timing increases current shareholder value in expectation, it
is sufficient to show that the new investors’ wealth, averaged over all possible values
of mispricing x, decreases. Integrating (B.22) over states x gives the expected change
in wealth from market timing for new investors
β
∫ ∞
−∞
2 (γx)2
(
Q+ −Q)−Q+Nγx
N − γx f (x) dx. (B.28)
Using the symmetry of the normal distribution, we can rewrite this value as
β
∫ ∞
0
(
2 (γx)2
(
Q+ −Q)+Q+Nγx
N + γx
+
2 (γx)2
(
Q+ −Q)−Q+Nγx
N − γx
)
f (x) dx
= 2Nβ
∫ ∞
0
(γx)2
(
Q+ − 2Q)
(N + γx) (N − γx)f (x) dx. (B.29)
Since Q+ < Q, it is negative. Therefore, it must be that current shareholder value
increases.
Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that current shareholder wealth decreases
with the timing of equity issuance when
n+m∑
i=n+1
E
[
W F<0i −W F=0i |x
]
=
βγx
N − γx
[
2γx
(
Q+ −Q)−Q+N] > 0. (B.30)
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Because for issuance x < 0 (overvaluation), current shareholders are worse off when
2γx
(
Q+ −Q) < Q+N,
which is satisfied since Q+ > Q.
(ii) For share repurchases of undervalued stock, we have x > 0. From (B.22), the
current shareholder value decreases with repurchase timing if
2γx
(
Q+ −Q) > Q+N. (B.31)
Since Q+ > Q, this condition is satisfied when mispricing is large, i.e., v > v, where
v ≡ P + Q
+N
2γ
(
Q+ −Q) . (B.32)
(iii) For new investors, the expected change in wealth from market timing is given
by (B.29), and it is positive when Q+ > 2Q. Therefore, it must be that current
shareholder value is lower with market timing.
Proof of Proposition 5.
The problem of maximizing current shareholder value is equivalent to minimizing
value for new investors with respect to F . Using expression for P ′2, we have
min
F
n+m∑
i=n+1
E [Xi (P
′
2 − P1) |v] = min
F
N
n+m∑
i=n+1
Xi
(E (P2|v)− P1)
N − F . (B.33)
We start with a linear conjecture for the equilibrium price schedule
P1 = P − α + βF. (B.34)
It is easy to check that the solution exists only if
(
2Q−Q+)(N − 2γx− α
β
)
> 0. (B.35)
Using (B.34) and demand functions for individual investors (2.11), the objective func-
tion (B.33) can be simplified to
min
F
(
Q+ − Fm
n+m
) (2γx+ α
β
− F
)
N − F ' minF
(
Q+ − Fm
n+m
) (2γx+ α
β
− F
)
N
.
(B.36)
Solving for optimal demand by the manager gives
F ∗ =
n+m
2m
Q+ + γx+
α
2β
. (B.37)
113
For individuals who observe the firm’s trade F , the conditional mean of P2 is
E(P2|F, info) = P − α− βQ+n+m
m
+ 2βF, (B.38)
E(P2|F ) = λE(P2|F, info) + (1− λ)E(P2|F, no info) (B.39)
= P − λα− λβQ+n+m
m
+ 2λβF.
The equilibrium price is found from the market clearing condition, which can be
written as
P1 =
θF
n+m
+ E (P2|F ) =
(
θ
n+m
+ 2λβ
)
F + P − λα− λβQ+n+m
m
. (B.40)
We compare the expression above to the price conjecture (B.34) and solve for α and
β
β =
θ
(n+m) (1− 2λ) > 0, (B.41)
α =
λθQ+
(1− λ) (1− 2λ)m > 0. (B.42)
Substituting parameters in (B.37) yields
F ∗ = F + γ
(
v − P) , (B.43)
F =
Q+
1− λ
n+m
2m
. (B.44)
Since new investors on average buy the stock, Q+ > 0, it follows that F > 0. Finally,
using the fixed-point argument we derive the parameters µu and σ
2
u consistent with the
conditional probability λ of the signal coming from the informed manager. Following
the same steps as in the first proposition, we obtain
µu =
Q+
1− λ
n+m
2m
, (B.45)
σ2u =
(n+m)2 (1− 2λ)2 σ4p
4θ2
(
σ2p + σ
2
ε
) . (B.46)
Proof of Proposition 6.
(i) The probability of a stock repurchase is larger than the probability of an equity
sale because
Pr (F ∗ > 0)− Pr (F ∗ < 0) =
∫ ∞
−F
γ
f (x) dx−
∫ −F
γ
−∞
f (x) dx = 1− 2Φ(− F
γσ
) > 0,
(B.47)
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where f (x) is the normal distribution density function with zero mean and vari-
ance σ2 ≡ σ2p + σ2ε . Similarly, we show that the difference in total volume of stock
repurchases and equity sales is positive
Volume(Rep)− Volume(Iss) = E [F |F ∗ > 0] Pr (F ∗ > 0)− E [−F |F ∗ < 0] Pr (F ∗ < 0)
=
∫ ∞
−F
γ
(
F + γx
)
f (x) dx+
∫ −F
γ
−∞
(
F + γx
)
f (x) dx
= F > 0, (B.48)
where the last result is by symmetry of x probability distribution function.
(ii) A manager’s trading profit when she maximizes current shareholder value is
Π (v) = E [(P2 − P1)F |v] (B.49)
Substituting the expressions for the firm’s optimal demand for shares, F ∗, and the
equilibrium price schedule, P1, we have
Π (x) = β
(
γ2x2 + 2λγFx− F 2 (1− 2λ)
)
, (B.50)
From Proposition 5, we know that the firm will repurchase shares if and only if
x > −F
γ
. We need to show that expected profit from timing repurchases minus
expected profit from timing equity sales is negative, i.e.,∫∞
−F
γ
Π (x) f (x) dx∫∞
−F
γ
f (x) dx
−
∫ −F
γ
−∞ Π (x) f (x) dx∫ −F
γ
−∞ f (x) dx
< 0. (B.51)
Note that for standard normal distribution with cumulative density function Φ (x)
we have∫ B
A
x2f (x) dx =
σ2√
2piσ2
(
−Be− B
2
2σ2 + Ae−
A2
2σ2
)
+ σ2 (Φ (B/σ)− Φ(A/σ)) ,(B.52)∫ B
A
xf (x) dx = − σ
2
√
2piσ2
(
e−
B2
2σ2 − e− A
2
2σ2
)
, (B.53)∫ B
A
f (x) dx = Φ (B/σ)− Φ(A/σ), (B.54)
therefore, substituting (B.50), it is easy to show that (B.51) is satisfied for λ < 1/2.
(iii) The expected post-event price drift given managerial signal v is
R (x) = E (P2|v)− P1 = β
(
γx− F (1− 2λ)) . (B.55)
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Recall that the manager repurchases when x > −F
γ
. Therefore, the expected stock
returns conditional on issuance and repurchase are, respectively,∫ −F
γ
−∞ R (x) f (x) dx∫ −F
γ
−∞ f (x) dx
= − βγσ√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(
F
γσ
)2
/Φ(− F
γσ
)− βF (1− 2λ) , (B.56)
∫∞
−F
γ
R (x) f (x) dx∫∞
−F
γ
f (x) dx
=
βγσ√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(
F
γσ
)2
/
(
1− Φ(− F
γσ
)
)
− βF (1− 2λ) . (B.57)
The expected stock return following a stock issuance is always negative, while it
can be positive or negative following a repurchase. Since F > 0, it must be that
Φ(− F
γσ
) < 1/2 and we have
1− Φ(− F
γσ
) > Φ(− F
γσ
). (B.58)
Therefore, the absolute value of expected price drift following a repurchase is always
smaller than the value of expected price drift following equity issuance.
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B.1.1 CURRENT SHAREHOLDERS’ WELFARE ANALYSIS
Here we discuss the implications of a symmetric market timing strategy for the
welfare of current shareholders measured by their objective function (2.5). We then
analyze the optimal market timing strategy of an informed manager who aims to
maximize this objective function.
Recall that an equity issue of overvalued stock can decrease shareholder value. We
show below that a similar claim can be made for the expected utility of shareholders.
Specifically, we decompose the change in current shareholders’ expected utility into a
change in their expected wealth and a change in costs associated with deviation from
desired positions
n∑
i=1
E
[
UF<0i − UF=0i |v
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
W F<0i −W F=0i |v
]− n∑
i=1
E
[
θ
2
(Xi −Qi)2 |v
]
.
(B.59)
As we show in Proposition 3, the first term is negative when the stock overpricing is
small. To see that the change in utility is negative as well, note that by timing a firm
creates additional disutility for current shareholders because their demands deviate
from the initial preferences, i.e., Xi 6= Qi if F 6= 0. Therefore, the second term is
negative, and current shareholders are worse off from equity issuance of overvalued
stock. Using a similar line of reasoning, one can show that all claims of Proposition
4 also hold if we consider shareholders’ utility function instead of wealth.
Next we show that when the share turnover is low, current shareholders prefer
share repurchase timing over issuance timing. From the proof of Proposition 3, we
have the following relation between the current shareholders’ expected wealth changes
with repurchase and issuance timing
n∑
i=1
E
[
W F>0i −W F=0i |v, v > P
]
>
n∑
i=1
E
[
W F<0i −W F=0i |v, v < P
]
. (B.60)
Note also that the costs incurred by shareholders, θ
2
(Xi −Qi)2, are symmetric
with respect to mispricing, v − P ; that is
E
(
θ
2
(Xi −Qi)2 |v
)
=
θγ2
(
v − P)2
2 (n+m)2
. (B.61)
Therefore, when we subtract the respective costs from both sides of (B.60), the in-
equality remains unchanged, and we have
n∑
i=1
E
[
UF>0i − UF=0i |v, v > P
]
>
n∑
i=1
E
[
UF<0i − UF=0i |v, v < P
]
. (B.62)
We now analyze the optimal market timing strategy of a manager who wants to
maximize the expected utility of shareholders. This objective function is equivalent
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to minimizing the sum of the wealth of new investors and costs of suboptimal trades
for current shareholders
min
F
N
n+m∑
i=n+1
Xi
(E (P2|v)− P1)
N − F +
θF 2
2 (n+m)2
. (B.63)
Using the linear conjecture for the equilibrium price schedule
P1 = P − α + βF, (B.64)
we can further rewrite the objective function as
min
F
(
Q+ − Fm
n+m
)
(2γβx+ α− βF )
N
+
θF 2
2 (n+m)2
. (B.65)
Taking the first-order condition with respect to F , we obtain
F ∗ =
α + n+m
m
Q+β + 2γβx
2β + θN
m(n+m)
≡ F̂ + γ̂x. (B.66)
Since the manager’s demand is linear in mispricing, we have
E(P2|F ) = P − λα− λβQ+n+m
m
+ F
(
2βλ+
λθN
m (n+m)
)
. (B.67)
The equilibrium price is found from the market clearing condition
P1 =
θF
n+m
+E (P2|F ) =
(
θ
n+m
+ 2λβ +
λθN
m (n+m)
)
F +P −λα−λβQ+n+m
m
.
(B.68)
We now compare this expression with the price conjecture (B.34) and solve for α and
β
β =
θ
(
1 + λN
m
)
(1− 2λ) (n+m) > 0, (B.69)
α =
λQ+θ
(
1 + λN
m
)
(1− λ) (1− 2λ)m > 0. (B.70)
Substituting the solution back into (B.66) yields
F̂ = F
m+ λN
m+ 1
2
N
< F, (B.71)
γ̂ = γ
m+ λN
m+ 1
2
N
< γ, (B.72)
where F is given by (B.44). Note that F̂ > 0.
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B.1.2 MARKET TIMING PROFIT MEASURE
Although the construction of measures of profit from market timing may seem
intuitive, let us explain why it makes sense from a theory perspective. Intuitively,
the additional return earned on one share of stock as the result of market timing is
given by the difference between the realized stock return and the return if the firm
not issued or repurchased any stock. The latter return is unobservable, but it can be
inferred from the realized return and the cash going out of the firm (into the firm) at
the time of stock repurchase (stock issuance).
Specifically, consider a manager who repurchases a fraction α of her firm’s stock
at today’s price P1, expecting the stock to appreciate to P2 in the future. Even if
the manager’s expectation were correct, the future price will change as a result of the
repurchase itself. We denote this actual future price with P ′2. If the real policy of
the firm is independent of repurchases and issuances, then the non-arbitrage relation
between prices implies
(1− α)P ′2 = P2 − αP1. (B.73)
Empirically, we observe the actual price, P ′2, but not what the price would be had
the manager not repurchased any shares. Therefore, we infer P2 using the expression
(B.73) and obtain the additional return from repurchase as
Repurchase timing =
P ′2 − P2
P1
= α
(
P ′2 − P1
P1
)
. (B.74)
Note that a similar argument can be made for the calculation of market timing with
SEOs or general equity sales.
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